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ABSTRACT

U.S. and internationalaccounting-standardsetters plan to
launch a new, global revenue accounting standard, Revenue
from Contracts with Customers, in 2013. Poised at the nexus of
comparative contract law and international accounting, the
proposal's contract-based revenue recognition model creates new
legal risks and opportunities for accountants, lawyers, clients,
and financial statement users. Despite its focus on legally
enforceable contracts, the proposed standard was drafted
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without input from the legal community. This Article models the
proposal's complex contract-analysis process, demonstrating
that its revenue outcomes may vary materially because of
seemingly minor interjurisdictional differences in law
applicable to "open-price"contracts; offers practice pointers for
attorneys, accountants, and auditors; recommends changes to
the proposal, including the substitution of self-enforcing Nash
equilibriafor legally enforceable contracts;and encourages more
collaboration between the legal and accounting professions in
the joint deployment of legal and accounting expertise for better
value creation, value allocation,and risk mitigation.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The wheels of commerce would turn more smoothly if lawyers
better understood accounting and accountants better understood the
law. Exhibit A in support of this proposition is the international
revenue accounting exposure draft (ED), Revenue from Contracts
With Customers, 1 now under final review by the U.S. Financial
Accounting Standards Board 2 (FASB) and the International
Accounting Standards Board 3 (IASB) in preparation for global
implementation.

1.
The ED is available in International Accouting Standards Board (IASB)
and Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) versions. See Exposure DRAFT:
REVENUE FROM CONTRACTS WITH CUSTOMERS, ED/2011/6 (Int'l Acet. Standards Bd.
2011) (Proposed Exposure Draft 2011) [hereinafter EXPOSURE DRAFT] (IASB version),
available at http://www.ifrs.org/Current-Projects/IASB-Projects/Revenue-Recognition/
EDNov1/Documents/RevRecEDIIStandard.pdf; EXPOSURE DRAFT: REVENUE FROM
CONTRACTS WITH CUSTOMERS, ED/2011/6 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2011)
(Proposed Exposure Draft 2011) (FASB version), available at http://www.fasb.org/cs/
BlobServer?blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175823559369&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&
blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs. Hereinafter, unless otherwise noted, citations
to ED paragraphs will be to the IASB version. The original ED/2010/6 will be referred
to hereinafter as ED 2010.
2.
Effective September 15, 2009, the FASB promulgates U.S. generally
accepted accounting principles (U.S. GAAP) exclusively in the ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
CODIFICATION, subtopic 105-10-05 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2012) [hereinafter
FASB CODIFICATION], available at http://asc.fasb.org, which must be followed in the
preparation and auditing of U.S. GAAP-compliant financial statements of all for-profit
companies. The Codification and Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations,
issued by the SEC under its rule-making authority, comprise the accounting principles
binding on publicly traded, U.S.-headquartered companies. Id. Prior to September 15,
2009, U.S. GAAP was found in materials promulgated by the FASB and the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants archived at Pre-CodificationStandards, FIN.
ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD, http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/PreCodSectionPage&
cid=1218220137031 (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). These materials were ranked
hierarchically, in terms of their relative authoritative force. STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 162: THE HIERARCHY OF GENERALLY ACCEPTED
ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES 3 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2008) [hereinafter SFAS
162], available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fasl62.pdf.
3.
The IASB promulgates International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS). Preface to INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS TT 5, 7 (Int'l
Accounting
Standards
Bd.
2010),
available at
http://eifrs.iasb.org/eifrs/
bnstandards/en/preface.pdf. Prior to January 1, 2001, the IASB's predecessor, the
International Accounting Standards Committee, issued IAS, which continue in force
unless superseded by subsequently issued IFRS. INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING
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Hovering at the nexus of comparative contract law and
international accounting, the ED's contract-based revenue recognition
model offers a prime context for accountants and lawyers to work
together. Legal and management scholars in Europe and the United
States have previously encouraged lawyers and other professionals to
apply their expertise collaboratively to maximize business success. 4
So far, however, little, if any, collaboration has occurred in connection
with the ED.
Despite its singular focus on legally enforceable contracts, the
ED was drafted largely without input from the legal community,
which plays a leading role in the negotiation, drafting, interpretation,
and enforcement of contracts. Arguably, the ED's resulting
redundancy, internal inconsistency, and superfluous legal complexity
will increase both the costs of preparing and auditing financial
statements and the risks of revenue-related misunderstanding,
litigation, and regulatory-enforcement actions. This Article is, in part,
a call for collaboration between accountants and lawyers in an effort
to reduce or mitigate these costs and risks.
Accounting standards are a form of regulatory law governing
financial reporting. The ED, in particular, is a proposed regulation
governing how, when, and in what amounts market players are
entitled to claim credit, in the eyes of other market participants, for
having persuaded others to buy goods or services. Under the ED, as
currently written, revenue may be claimed or "recognized" only in the
context of legally enforceable contracts with customers. 5 Yet, as
discussed in greater detail below, some transactions or relationships

2012),
available
at
Accounting
Standards
Bd.
STANDARDS
(Int'l
http://www.ifrs.org/IFRSs/IAS.htm; see also Preface to INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
REPORTING STANDARDS, supra, 5. IAS are interchangeably referred to herein as
"IFRS" or "IAS" depending on the context.
See Constance E. Bagley, Winning Legally: The Value of Legal Astuteness,
4.
33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 378, 378-79 (2008) (analyzing the opportunities that are
inherent in management taking advantage of legal tools and knowledge as part of their
market strategy); Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, Robert Bird & Helena Haapio, Promoting
Business Success Through Contract Visualization, 17 J.L. BUS. & ETHICS 55, 61-62
(2011) (describing a collaborative proactive approach to contracting); Robert C. Bird,
Law, Strategy, and Competitive Advantage, 44 CONN. L. REV. 61, 71-81 (2011)
(discussing how businesses can gain a competitive advantage through legal
strategizing); Omar Ochoa, Filling the "GAAP"- Why Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles Should Inform U.C.C. Article 9 Decisions, 89 TEX. L. REV. 207, 207, 210
(2010) (lamenting the artificial separation of accountants and lawyers and advocating
the use of accounting rules to "fill holes within commercial law"); Damaris RosichSchwartz, Accounting Expertise and Attorney Compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, 24 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 533, 535-38 (2007) (stressing that corporate counsel
must understand financial accounting or enlist the help of accounting experts in order
to fulfill their professional duties to clients under Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307 and SEC
Rule 205); George J. Siedel & Helena Haapio, Using Proactive Law for Competitive
Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 641, 659-60 (2010) (discussing this type of collaboration in
the context of the Proactive Law Movement in Europe).
EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 1, T 8, 12-15.
5.
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that superficially appear to be enforceable contracts are revealed, on
closer examination under applicable local law, not to be contracts or
not to be enforceable. In contrast, some noncontractual relationships
with customers are legally enforceable. Meanwhile, in most
relationships, the parties perform their commitments because they
must do so out of commercial necessity, not because of the threat of
legal action in the event of a breach. Thus, it may be argued that the
scope of the ED is narrower than the commercial and legal reality it
seeks to portray.
Not surprisingly, in light of its contract focus, the ED relies on
contract-law terms, such as contract, consideration,enforceable, legal
title, modification, control, and transactionprice. These terms appear
in the ED 279, 150, 5, 7, 17, 55, and 81 times, respectively, and differ
in definition and cultural authority across jurisdictions, 6 as do
contract formation and validity,7 which are essential prerequisites to
legal enforceability. While the ED does not discuss contract formation
or validity, this Article illuminates a subset thereof: the extent to
which the price of goods or services must be specified in order to form
a valid, enforceable contract.
More specifically, this Article (a) models the ED's contractanalysis and revenue recognition process, demonstrating in
microcosm how outcomes may vary even because of seemingly minor
interjurisdictional differences in contract law applicable to "open
price" contracts; (b) offers practice pointers for attorneys,
accountants, and auditors; (c) recommends changes to the ED;8 and

6.
See John H. Matheson, Convergence, Culture and Contract Law in China,
15 MINN. J. INT'L L. 329, 345 (2006) (describing how in China, written contracts are
often viewed as either the beginning of a negotiation process or, more negatively, as a
last resort when personal relations and verbal agreements fail). See generally Reinhard
Zimmermann, The Present State of European Private Law, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 479
(2009) (examining European private-law documents to determine the extent of
commonality among them). The ED does not define consideration, despite its 150
mentions, leaving the interpretation to user discretion.
7.
See, e.g., United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods arts. 8, 11, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG], availableat
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitrallen/uncitral-texts/sale-goods/1980CISG.html (referencing
unwritten agreements that are binding and may be proven with reference "to all
relevant circumstances," including negotiations and subsequent conduct between the
parties); MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino, S.P.A., 144
F.3d 1384, 1388-89 (11th Cir. 1998) (discussing the CISG's reliance on the parties'
subjective intent and conduct in determining contractual validity and comparing it to
the U.S. parol evidence rule). In contrast, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and
common law prohibit the use of contemporaneous external or "parol" evidence to prove
or interpret contracts and require that certain contracts be written. See id. at 1389
(describing the UCC's writing requirement and indicating that few courts have adopted
the more flxible CISG approach).
8.
The ED will not be effective until at least 2015. See infra note 41 and
accompanying text.
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(d) encourages collaboration between legal and accounting professions
9
in accounting-standard setting, especially in relation to the ED.
The remainder of the Article is structured as follows. Part L.A
defines and contextualizes revenue, highlighting its importance in the
financial reporting and analysis environment. Part I.B summarizes
related research and commentary in the fields of comparative law and
accounting. Part II describes the ED's revenue recognition process
and summarizes the ED's contract-relevant provisions. Part III
applies the ED's contract-analysis and revenue recognition provisions
to an historical transaction involving the proposed international sale
of jet engines, comparing the likely results across six different
contract-law regimes. Part IV concludes with summary observations
and recommendations.
A. Revenue Primer

Revenue may be viewed as fuel that powers a business
enterprise and has been defined as the periodic "gross inflow of
0
economic benefits" from the ordinary activities of the business.' Also
called sales or turnover,'1 revenue is typically found on the first or top
12
line of the income statements of U.S.- and European-listed firms.
Revenue's significance derives partly from its status as the central
element of operating income, which is a component of net income or

net earnings.1 3 These relationships may be stated algebraically as
follows:

Georgetown Law Library's Accounting Research page, Accounting Research
9.
Guide, GEORGETOWN L. LIBR., http://www.1l.georgetown.edulguides/accounting.cfm
(last visited Feb. 15, 2013), is a sign that accounting is beginning to receive attention in
the legal community.
10.

See INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS,

supra note 3, standard 18

7.
See Christopher Nobes, On the Definitions of Income and Revenue in IFRS,
11.
9 AccT. EUR. 85, 91-92 (2012) (referring to the British Companies Act's use of the term
turnover); Susan M. Sorensen & Donald L. Kyle, Found in Translation, 203 J. ACCT.
38, 41 exhibit 3 (2007) (comparing the UK term turnover to the U.S. equivalent sales).
In English-speaking countries, the income statement is also sometimes called the
"statement of operations" or "results." Accounting terminology and standards used to
prepare income statements vary among countries and through time. See generally
WORLD ACCOUNTING (John D. Gould & Kurt S. Schulzke eds., 2011) (documenting local
accounting standards in more than thirty countries); Deloitte, Jurisdictions,IASPLUS,
http://iasplus.comlen/jurisdictions (last visited Feb. 15, 2013) (summarizing accounting
standards and applicability of IFRS by jurisdiction worldwide).
12.

See, e.g., MERCK, CONSOLIDATED INCOME STATEMENT (2011), available at

see
http://merck.online-report.eul2011/ar/financialstatements/incomestatement.html;
also Nobes, supra note 11, at 92 ("[Revenue] is conventionally presented as the first
line of the income statement.").
Net income may also be styled "profit." See, e.g., MERCK, supra note 12.
13.

2013]

LEXIS NEXUS COMPLEXUS LA WAND REVENUE ACCOUNTING COLLIDE

521

Operating income 1 4 = revenue - operatingexpenses,
and
Net income = operating income - nonoperating expenses.
While net income is widely regarded as a key indicator of firm
value,' 5 recent research indicates that revenue itself also acts as a
highly significant financial-performance indicator. 16 Furthermore,
revenue has been found to be a predictor of firm value independent of
net income,' 7 and has increased in firm-value relevance over time, as
the value relevance of net income has decreased.' 8
The importance of revenue is further corroborated by the
existence of Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 104, published by the
Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) chief accountant,
which is focused solely on revenue recognition. 19 The frequent

14.
Operating income may also be called "results of operations" or "operating
result." Id.
15.
See Uday Chandra & Byung T. Ro, The Role of Revenue in Firm Valuation,
22 ACCT. HORIZONS 199, 199-200 (2008) (discussing the merits of using revenue and
earnings in firm valuations); Letter from the Hundred Grp. of Fin. Dirs. to the Int'l
Accounting Standards Bd. [IASB] 1 (Apr. 3, 2012), available at http://www.fasb.org/cs/
BlobServer?blobkey-id&blobwhere=1175823852005&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&
blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs
("Revenue is an important measure of
business performance and in some industries is used as an indicator of the value of
businesses.").
16.
See Chandra & Ro, supra note 15, at 220-21 (summarizing findings that
imply that revenue is a good indicator of value-relevant information and other
variables); Am. Accounting Ass'n Fin. Accounting Standards Comm. [FASC], Response
to the Financial Accounting Standards Board's and the International Accounting
Standards Board's Joint Discussion Paper Entitled Preliminary Views on Revenue
Recognition in Contracts with Customers, 24 ACCT. HORIZONS 689, 691 (2010)
(analyzing an attempt to standardize revenue recognition standards given that this
measure is "extremely important to investors"); Letter from the Inst. der
Wirtschaftspriifer to the IASB 2 (Oct. 13, 2010), http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?
blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175821482858&blo
bheader=application%2Fpdf ("Revenue is a crucial part of financial reporting and plays
an important role in the assessment of an entity's performance.").
17.
Chandra & Ro, supra note 15, at 201-02.
18.
Id.
19.
SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 104, 17 C.F.R. § 211 (2003) [hereinafter
SAB No. 104], available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sabl04rev.pdf. Staff
Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 104 was preceded by SAB No. 101. See SEC Staff
Accounting
Bulletin
No.
101,
17
C.F.R
§ 211 (1999),
available at
http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab101.htm. Comparing the relative importance of
revenue and net income, it is worth noting that while SAB No. 104 is dedicated to
revenue, no SAB is focused on net income. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin: Codification
of Staff Accounting Bulletins, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/
interps/account/sabcode.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2013). Recognition has been defined
as recording "in the balance sheet or income statement an item that meets the
definition of [a financial statement] element and satisfies the [paragraph 4.38] criteria
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appearance of revenue recognition in financial reporting fraud
provides additional evidence that revenue is independently material
to preparers, readers, and regulators of financial statements. A 2010
study by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission 20 found that revenue recognition accounted for 61
percent of SEC fraud cases in the 1998-2007 interval, up from 50
percent in 1987-1997, and was the single most common source of
2
financial reporting fraud in both periods. 1
Legal counsel and accountants must understand how the
interplay between revenue and the law affects associated risks and
returns, in order to effectively serve stakeholders, such as owners,
creditors, officers, directors, and auditors. With respect to revenue
recognition, mutual understanding between lawyers and accountants
is essential to the achievement of three objectives at the intersection
or nexus of law and accounting: value creation, value allocation, and
risk mitigation.
First, a cross-disciplinary, business-oriented approach to contract
drafting, as advocated by the Nordic School,22 can create firm value
by favorably altering the fact, amount, and timing of revenue. These,
in turn, affect financial position (through assets or liabilities reported
in the balance sheet) and operating results (through revenue in the
income statement), thereby impacting stock price, access to financing,
and strategic position in the market. Second, revenue is frequently
incentive
loans,
involving
written into legal agreements
compensation, corporate mergers and acquisitions, buy-sell clauses,
wills and trusts, and other transactions 23 as a benchmark for

for recognition." IASB, THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL REPORTING
4.37 (2010), available at http://eifrs.ifrs.org/eifrs/bnstandards/en/2012/framework.pdf.
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission
20.
(COSO) is a joint initiative of the American Accounting Association, American Institute
of CPAs, Financial Executives International, Institute of Management Accountants,
and Institute of Internal Auditors. See COSO, http://www.coso.org/ (last visited Feb. 16,
2013). COSO is best known as the institutional author of the COSO Internal Control
Framework used by all U.S. public companies to evaluate and report in their SEC
filings on the effectiveness of financial internal controls. See, e.g., DELTA AIR LINES,
INC., 10-K: ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 AND 15(D), at 86 (Feb. 10, 2012),

available at http://images.delta.com.edgesuite.net/deltalpdfs/annual-reports/DeltaAir
Lines IOK 2011.pdf.
COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM'N, FRAUDULENT
21.
FINANCIAL REPORTING: 1998-2007: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. PUBLIC COMPANIES 4 (2010),
available at http://www.coso.org/documents/ COSOFRAUDSTUDY2010_- 001.pdf.
See Siedel & Haapio, supra note 4, at 659 ("The Nordic School is a network
22.
of researchers and practicioners from Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and
Sweden, each of whom has an interest in Proactive Law."). See generally Gerlinde
Berger-Walliser, The Past and Future of Proactive Law: An Overview of the
Development of the Proactive Law Movement, in PROACTIVE LAW IN A BUSINESS
ENVIRONMENT 13 (Gerlinde Berger-Walliser & Kim Ostergaard eds., 2012) (describing
the proactive law philosophy and the Nordic school).
See Chandra & Ro, supra note 15, at 202 ("[A] primary objective of
23.
accounting data is to provide verifiable summary measures of performance for use in
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allocating value among business owners or between the business and
other stakeholders, such as employees, suppliers, customers, or
creditors. Third, revenue embodies significant legal risk because of
the role it often plays in financial statement restatements, SEC
investigations, 24 and securities-fraud claims against firms,
executives, 25 and auditors. 26
Despite the centrality of revenue to financial reporting, to date,
the FASB has promulgated neither a general definition of revenue
nor a generally applicable rule for timing or measuring revenue. 27

debt and compensation contracts . . . . [Clompensation committees would like to know
in which situations they should include revenue in management contracts.").
24.
See SEC, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 704 OF THE SARBANEs-OXLEY ACT
OF 2002, at 2 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/ news/studies/sox704report.pdf
(determining that 126 of 227 SEC enforcement matters in the five years ending in 2002
involved revenue recognition issues); Dana R. Hermanson, Daniel M. Ivancevich &
Susan H. Ivancevich, SOX Section 404 Material Weaknesses Related to Revenue
Recognition, 78 CPA J. 40, 40-41 (2008) (explaining that revenue recognition may be
the biggest single source of material errors in U.S. financial reporting). Some readers
may wonder about the income tax ramifications of revenue accounting in general and
of the ED in particular. The scope of this Article is limited to so-called financial
accounting, meaning general purpose accounting rules used in preparing and auditing
financial statements used primarily by equity investors and creditors in making
investment and lending decisions, because the ED itself will be binding only for
financial accounting purposes except in jurisdictions where financial accounting income
forms an element of the tax base.
25.
See, e.g., SEC v. Nacchio, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1105 (D. Colo. 2010)
(explaining that the primary focus of the SEC's case is Qwest's public reporting of
revenue); SEC v. Nacchio, No. 05-cv-00480-MSK-CBS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76138, at
*3-4 (D. Colo. Jul. 14, 2008) (establishing that the SEC's complaint alleged that senior
company executives perpetrated a "massive financial fraud" in part by reporting $3
billion in false revenue).
26.
See, e.g., PUBLIC Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD. [PCAOB], REPORT ON
OBSERVATIONS OF PCAOB INSPECTORS RELATED TO AUDIT RISK AREAS AFFECTED BY

THE ECONOMIC CRISIS, PCAOB RELEASE NO. 2010-006, at 18 (2010), available at
http://pcaobus.org/Inspections/Documents/4010

ReportEconomicCrisis.pdf

(indicating that financial-statement fraud often involves inappropriate revenue
recognition due to increased pressure on companies to meet internal and market
expectations).
27.
Katherine A. Schipper et al., Reconsidering Revenue Recognition, 23 ACCT.
HORIZONs 55, 57 (2009). However, in an apparent effort to informally mitigate this lack
of authoritative revenue recognition guidance, on September 15, 2009, paragraphs
83(a) and 83(b) of FASB Concepts Statement No. 5, which discuss revenue at a general
level, were added to the FASB Codification, Subtopic 605-10-25-1, without the
notice-and-comment process required for FASB standard setting. See FASB
CODIFICATION, supra note 2, subtopic 605-10-25-1; see also RULES OF PROCEDURE 17

(Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2012), available at http://www.fasb.org (follow "About
FASB"; then "Our Rules of Procedure"). Contradicting Subtopic 605-10-25-1, Subtopic
105-10-05-3, also effective September 15, 2009, states that FASB Concepts Statements
(such as No. 5) are nonauthoritative. FASB CODIFICATION, supra note 2, Subtopic 105ORIGINAL
STANDARDS BD. [FASB],
10-05-3;
see also FIN. ACCOUNTING
PRONOUNCEMENTS AS AMENDED: STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS

NO. 5, at CON5-4 (2008), available at http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey=id&
blobwhere=1175820900391&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobcol=urldata&blobtab1
e=MungoBlobs ("Statements of Financial Accounting Concepts do not establish
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This gap in U.S. general revenue recognition guidance has spawned
more than two hundred separate pieces of industry- and transactionspecific guidance, 2 8 now included in the FASB Codification under
Topic 605. 29 Their multiplicity is cited as a justification for the
development of a generally applicable revenue accounting standard.30
In the absence of generally applicable U.S. revenue accounting
rules, financial-statement preparers and auditors now typically follow
SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 104,31 which presents views
of the SEC's chief accountant and Division of Corporation Finance.3 2
While SABs are technically nonbinding because they are not issued
through due process rulemaking by the SEC itself,33 they have been
cited by the SEC and federal courts as persuasive authority on how
companies should apply existing U.S. generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP) in the SEC reporting context, 34 as "guidance"
36
issued by the SEC, 35 or even as full-on SEC rules.

standards prescribing accounting procedures or disclosure practices . . . which are
issued by the Board as Statements of Financial Accounting Standards."); Concepts
Statements, FIN. AccT. STANDARDS BOARD, http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/
SectionPage&cid=1176156317989 (last visited Feb. 16, 2013) ("A Statement of
Financial Accounting Concepts does not establish generally accepted accounting
standards."). Nevertheless, according to the FASB Codification, in appropriate
circumstances in the absence of applicable authoritative GAAP, nonauthoritative
materials may be used as guidance. FASB CODIFICATION, supra note 2, subtopic 10510-05-1.
28.
Schipper, supra note 27, at 55.
29.
See, e.g., FASB CODIFICATION, supra note 2, subtopic 954-605-25 (regarding
revenue from health care services); id. subtopic 926-605-25 (regarding revenue from
film sales); id. subtopic 605-35 (regarding revenue from construction-type and
production-type contracts).
30.
See Schipper, supra note 27, at 55 ("The earnings process is
complete . . . and revenue is recognized, when the selling firm has provided the goods
or services and the buying party has accepted .. . and agreed to pay."); see also FASC,
Accounting for Revenues: A Frameworkfor Standard Setting, 25 AcCT. HORIZONS 577,
577-78 (2011) (discussing the need for a uniform type of revenue accounting standard
that applies to all contexts).
31.
SAB No. 104, supra note 19, at 9-10.
32.
Id. at 2; SFAS 162, supra note 2, at n.1 (noting that SABs "represent
practices followed by the staff in administering SEC disclosure requirements").
See SAB No. 104, supra note 19, at 1-2 ("[S]taff accounting bulletins are
33.
not rules or interpretations of the Commission, nor are they published as bearing the
Commission's approval. They represent interpretations and practices followed by the
Division of Corporation Finance and the Office of Chief Accountant in administering
the disclosure requirements of the Federal securities laws."); see also Paul S. Atkins,
SEC Comm'r, Remarks at the "SEC Speaks in 2008" Program of the Practising Law
Inst. (Feb. 8, 2008), transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speechl2008/
spch02O8O8psa.htm ("The process of issuing [SABs] is organized to avoid
'complications' with the Administrative Procedure Act. . . . The Commission never
voted on the views espoused within any SAB, so it does not and cannot represent the
views of the SEC. Worse yet, SEC staff developed SAB 99 without public input.").
See, e.g., Allen v. Admin. Review Bd., 514 F.3d 468, 478 (5th Cir. 2008)
34.
(finding that unlike rules promulgated by the SEC, SABs are not accounting rules and
do not carry the force of law, but provide guidance to companies in applying SEC rules
and GAAP); New Orleans Emp. Ret. Sys. v. Celestica, Inc., No. 10-4702-cv, 2011 U.S.
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In 2002, the FASB and IASB began developing a joint,
international revenue recognition standard as part of their larger
effort to globally harmonize accounting standards.3 7 The first FASB
and IASB attempt at a harmonized revenue standard was exposed for
comment in June 2010 and subsequently withdrawn in response to
constituent concerns. 38 On November 14, 2011, the boards published
a revised ED whose comment period closed on March 13, 2012.39 The
boards have since made clear their intention to implement the
revision, with an effective date not earlier than January 1, 2015,40
substantially without addressing the issues discussed in this
Article. 41

App. LEXIS 25921, at *13 (2d Cir. Dec. 29, 2011) (citing SAB No. 99, inter alia, to
define materiality in reversing dismissal for failure to state a claim); see also Strom v.
United States, 583 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1270-71 (W.D. Wash. 2008) (questioning, on
summary judgment, the legal import of SABs and observing that SAB No. 65 is not an
SEC rule or interpretation but an SEC staff guideline for application of accounting
rules), rev'd on other grounds, 641 F.3d 1051, 1071 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that SAB No.
65 is not binding but nevertheless supports reversal of summary judgment); In re BioTech. Gen. Corp. Sec. Litig., 380 F. Supp. 2d 574, 580 (D.N.J. 2005) (noting that SAB
No. 101 is an SEC staff interpretation of GAAP); SEC v. Geswein, No. 5:10-cv-1235,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111906, at *34 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 2011) (discussing SAB No.
104 and how SABs generally provide persuasive guidance). In fairness to the courts,
accounting scholars have also mischaracterized SABs as U.S. GAAP standards, even in
one of the most prestigious peer-reviewed accounting journals, The Accounting Review.
See, e.g., Dain C. Donelson, John M. McInnis & Richard D. Mergenthaler, Rules-Based
Accounting Standards and Litigation, 87 AccT. REV. 1247, 1263, 1264-65 (2012)
(identifying SAB No. 101 as a U.S. GAAP standard).
35.
See Barrie v. Intervoice-Brite, Inc., 397 F.3d 249, 257 (5th Cir.) (stating
that the SEC "issued Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101 ... to guide companies in
applying SEC Rules and GAAP to revenue recognition issues"), opinion modified on
other grounds, 409 F.3d 653 (5th Cir. 2005).
36.
See, e.g., In re Scientific Atlanta, Inc. Sec. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1358
(N.D. Ga. 2010) (relying on accounting expert's citation to SAB No. 101 as GAAP); In re
U.S. Office Prods. Sec. Litig., 326 F. Supp. 2d 68, 77 (D.D.C. 2004) (referring to SAB
No. 96 as "an SEC rule"); In re Dohan + Co. CPAs (2011) (SEC final order) (relying in
part on SAB No. 104 in support of an administrative order censuring an audit firm and
disbarring from
SEC
practice
two
individual
auditors),
available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2011/34-63740.pdf.
37.
See Frank E. Ryerson III, Major Changes Proposed to GAAP for Revenue
Recognition, 5 J. FIN. & ACcT. 1, 2 (Dec. 2010) ("The stated objective of the Revenue
Recognition Project is to develop coherent conceptual guidance for revenue recognition
and a comprehensive statement on revenue recognition based on those concepts.").
38.
EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 1, IN5.
39.
Id. at 2; see supra text accompanying note 2.
40.
EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 1, IN35, app. I Cl. The boards currently
plan to promulgate the finalized ED as a binding standard during the first half of 2013.
Current Technical Plan and Project Updates, FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD,
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1218220137074 (last visited Feb.
16, 2013).
41.
Project Updates, Revenue Recognition, Summary of Decisions Reached to
Date, FIN. AccT. STANDARDS BOARD, http://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?site=
FASB&c=FASBContentC&pagename=FASB%2FFASBContentC%2FProjectUpdateP
age&cid=1175801890084#summary (last updated Feb. 8, 2013).
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Once effective, the ED will be authoritative for companies
required or allowed to publish financial statements in accordance
with U.S. GAAP or International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS). Jurisdictions that currently require U.S. GAAP or IFRS
financial statements include the United States, 42 the European
Union, 43 and Canada, in addition to numerous other countries. 44
IFRS financial statements are currently not permitted in a variety of
jurisdictions, including China, Singapore, and Thailand, where
national accounting standards continue in force. 45
Because of its customer-contracts scope, the ED will not be a
generally applicable revenue recognition standard. However, it will
be the most broadly applicable revenue accounting standard in U.S.
history and will supersede more than three-dozen extant industryfocused U.S. GAAP revenue standards. 46 Similarly, in the IFRS
arena, the ED will supersede the six core current IFRS revenue

42.
The SEC permits companies listed in but headquartered outside the United
States to choose one of three options for preparing their financial statements: U.S.
GAAP, IFRS as promulgated by the IASB, or any other "comprehensive set of
accounting principles" accompanied by a separate reconciliation of income and equity
to U.S. GAAP. 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-01(a)(2) (2012).
43.
The European Union requires listed companies organized under the laws of
any EU member state to follow IFRS, as adopted by the European Parliament and the
Council, in preparing consolidated financial statements. EC Regulation 1606/2002 on
the Application of International Accounting Standards, 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1, available
For nonconsolidated
at http://www.esma.europa.eulsystem/files/Reg-1606-02.pdf.
financial statements (and financial statements for nonlisted companies), each EU state
is permitted to independently determine whether companies must follow IFRS or local,
home-country GAAP. Id. at 3. The European Union allows U.S.-domiciled companies
listed in the European Union to report financial statements in accordance with U.S.
GAAP. Commission Regulation 1289/2008, art. 1, 2008 O.J (L 340) 17, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eulLexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:
340:0017:0019:EN:PDF.
44.
See The Move Towards Global Standards, IFRS, http://www.ifrs.org/Usearound-the-world/Pages/Use-around-the-world.aspx (last visited Feb. 16, 2013) ("All
major economies have established time lines to converge with or adopt IFRSs in the
near future."); Use of IFRS by Jurisdiction, IASPLUS, http://www.iasplus.com/en/
resources/use-of-ifrs (last visited Feb. 16, 2013) ("Many jurisdictions that maintain
their own local GAAP claim that their local GAAP is 'based on' or 'similar to' or
converged with' IFRSs.").
by
Jurisdiction, IASPLUS,
Deloitte,
Use
of
IFRS
45.
See
http://www.iasplus.comlen/resources/use-of-ifrs (last visited Feb. 17, 2013); see also
WORLD ACCOUNTING, supra note 11, at PRC-1, PRC-4 to -8 (discussing how the Chinese
Ministry of Finance requires companies to follow Chinese accounting standards which,
though harmonized to a large extent with IFRS, retain significant local peculiarities).
46 EXPOSURE DRAFT: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FASB ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
CODIFICATION: REVENUE RECOGNITION (TOPIC 605): REVENUE FROM CONTRACTS WITH
2012),
available at
Standards Bd.
3-4
(Fin. Accounting
CUSTOMERS
http://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?site=FASB&c=Page&pagename=FASB%2FPage
%2FSectionPage&cid=1176157086783 (proposing that revenue accounting standards
superseded by the ED include those for airlines, films, music, U.S. federal government
contractors, health care, and software).
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accounting standards, most notably International Accounting
Standard (IAS) 18 (Revenue) and IAS 11 (Construction Contracts). 47

B. Related Research and Commentary
1.

Comparative Contract Law

Comparative law literature establishes that contract law and its
enforcement vary among, 48 and even within, 49 jurisdictions. In
addition, a contract that is theoretically enforceable may be
practically unenforceable or may yield more or less cash flow in some
jurisdictions than others because of jurisdiction- or forum-specific
law, or enforcement and implementation anomalies.50
Beyond mere interjurisdictional contract law variability, some
legal commentators have observed that contract drafting choices,
including the choice of governing law, can be used strategically to
obtain commercial advantage5 and create value. 52 However, despite
the clear connection between contract law and revenue recognition,
available data suggest that the legal community either does not fully

47.
See EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 1, C6 (listing the six standards that the
draft supersedes).
48.
See, e.g., Claire A. Hill & Christopher King, Law and Language: How Do
German Contracts Do as Much with Fewer Words?, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 889, 910
(2004) (giving the example that the German contract concept cic "might render a seller
liable for 'insufficient' disclosures to a buyer when U.S. law would have given the buyer
no recourse"); Antonio Lordi, Towards a Common Methodology in Contract Law, 22 J.L.
& COM. 1, 2 (2002) (proposing that civil- and common-law contract lawyers adopt a
harmonized approach to contract analysis); Matheson, supra note 6, at 335 (asserting
that knowledge of Chinese contract law and how it differs from Western norms is
essential for Westerners doing business in China); Siedel & Haapio, supra note 1, at
668; Zimmermann et al., supra note 6, at 479-82 (discussing the status of efforts to
harmonize European contract law). See generally Kalvis Torgans & Amy Bushaw,
Some Comparative Aspects of Contract Law in Civil and Common Law Systems, 12
INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 37 (2002) (noting that the U.S. common-law contract concept is
more narrow than that of Latvian law).
49.
See generally Arthur Rosett, Critical Reflections on the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 265
(1984) (considering general issues presented by the UN Convention and its attempt to
standardize contract law).
50.
See, e.g., Matheson, supra note 6, at 375-82 (describing the comparative
"current chaos of Chinese law" featuring judicial decrees overturned by nonjudicial
government entities and appeals entered by nonparties, leading to problematically
lower outcome predictability for investors); see also Rosett, supra note 49, at 285
(discussing how the arbiter's interpretation of agreements and facts, not the mere
rules, typically determines the outcome of legal contests).
51.
See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo, Strategic Contracting: Contract Law as a
Source of Competitive Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 727, 767 (2010) (outlining the
strategic use of contract terms).
52.
See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal
Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 293 (1984) (suggesting that "business
lawyers serve as transaction cost engineers and that this function has the potential for
creating value").
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appreciate the importance of revenue recognition or is willing to allow
nonlawyers to control the debate. In scholarly legal commentary, one
article-ironically published just months before the collapse of Enron
and demise of mega-certified public accounting firm Arthur
Andersen-associated revenue recognition with contract law,5 3 but
did not discuss how comparative contract law might impact revenue.
Practicing attorneys have been similarly silent, at least in their
public comments; none of the combined 1,345 comment letters
submitted in response to the ED 54 and ED 2010s5 was written by a
practicing attorney or legal academic writing as such.
Further evidence of the legal community's noninvolvement in
drafting the ED was offered by FASB member Tom Linsmeier who, in
an October 2011 interview, stated his understanding that neither the
FASB nor the IASB had formally involved legal experts (either
practicing attorneys or legal scholars) in the drafting process. 56
2.

Accounting and Revenue Recognition

Accounting research recognizes that legal differences among
countries may materially impact financial results and disclosures, yet
so far has not directly examined the relationship between
comparative contract law and revenue recognition.
Bikki Jaggi and Pek Yee Low compared financial disclosures of
firms in common-law countries with disclosures of firms in so-called
code-law countries, using corporate disclosure data obtained from the

53.
See Robert A. Prentice, The Casefor Educating Legally-Aware Accountants,
38 AM. Bus. L.J. 597, 615, 617 (2001) (noting that financial statement auditors must
understand contract law to properly audit revenue assertions).
The 359 comment letters submitted in response to the ED can be accessed
54.
at FASB Comment Letters, FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD, http://www.fasb.org/
jspfFASB/CommentLetterC/CommentLetterPage&cid=1218220137090&projectid=20
11-230&page-number=1 (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).
The 986 comment letters submitted in response to the ED 2010 can be
55.
accessed
at
FASB
Comment
Letters, FIN. ACCT.
STANDARDS
BOARD,
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/CommentLetterC/CommentLetterPage&cid=121822013
7090&project -id=1820-100&pagenumber= (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).
Interview with Thomas J. Linsmeier, Board Member, FASB, in Kennesaw,
56.
Georgia (Oct. 13, 2011). Prabhakar Kalavacherla, the IASB member in charge of the
revenue recognition project, echoed Linsmeier, stating that he could think of no
comment letters from law firms and that the IASB had not actively reached out to
attorneys, in part because IASB members and staff were occupied with other groups
that had demonstrated significant interest in the ED. Interview with Prabhakar
Kalavacherla, Board Member, IASB, in Kennesaw, Georgia (Sep. 10, 2012). The views
of Linsmeier and Kalavacherla are corroborated by a May 2012 FASB-IASB staff
memorandum indicating that no attorney or law firm acting as such was formally
approached by either board in relation to the ED. FASB & IASB, FASB-IASB
REVENUE RECOGNITION STAFF PAPER: SUMMARY OF OUTREACH (2012), available at
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey-id&blobwhere=1175824041164&blobheade
r=application%2Fpdf&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs.
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International Financial Reporting Index for Industrial Companies. 5 7
They found common-law countries associated with more extensive
financial disclosure than code-law countries.58
Similarly, Robert M. Bushman and Joseph D. Piotroski analyzed
the influence of legal systems on incentives for accounting
conservatism, finding that companies in jurisdictions with stronger
investor
protections
and
well-functioning judicial
systems
communicate negative earnings information more quickly than
companies in countries where investor protections are weak and the
judicial systems are of low quality.59
Elaine Henry, Stephen Lin, and Ya-wen Yang found that net
income and shareholders' equity reconciliation amounts filed with the
SEC by IFRS-compliant issuers on Form 20-F varied significantly
according to the issuer's legal origin, leading the authors to question
whether IFRS is internationally homogeneous. 60
Christopher Nobes examined UK, German, French, and Italian
regulators' interpretations of the terms present fairly and give a true
and fair view, finding variation among and within the studied
countries, in part because of legal and linguistic differences among
them.61 In a separate paper, without reference to the relationship
between revenue recognition and contract law, Nobes opined that IAS
18's definition of revenue contains four errors that persist in the
ED. 62
Steven M. Mintz examined the ED's contract emphasis but did
not mention the word law or seriously address contract-law

57.
Bikki Jaggi & Pek Yee Low, Impact of Culture, Market Forces, and Legal
System on FinancialDisclosures, 25 INT. J. ACCT. 495, 505 (2000). The final sample
included 401 firms composed of 263 from common-law countries (represented by
Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom) and 138 from code-law countries
(represented by France, Germany, and Japan), where code law and common law refer,
respectively, to the Napoleonic civil-code tradition (which emphasizes the preeminence
of the legislature and eschews judicially created case law) and the English common-law
tradition (which, conversely, embraces judicial case law). Id.
58.
Id. at 516.
59.
Robert M. Bushman & Joseph D. Piotroski, FinancialReporting Incentives
for Conservative Accounting: The Influence of Legal and Political Institutions, 42 J.

ACCT. & ECON. 107, 108 (2006).
60.
Elaine Henry, Stephen Lin & Ya-wen Yang, The European-U.S. "GAAP
Gap"- IFRS to U.S. GAAP Form 20-F Reconciliations, 23 ACCT. HORIZONS 121, 124
(2009). The study examined the financial statements of IFRS-reporting EU companies
with both U.S. listings and 20-F reconciliations, categorizing them as having commonor civil-law legal origins, among civil-law countries, as pertaining to French, German,
or Scandinavian legal "families." Id. at 126.
61.
See Christopher Nobes, The Importance of Being Fair:An Analysis of IFRS
Regulation and Practice-A Comment, 39 AcCT. & Bus. RES. 415, 417-20 (2009)
(explaining that the question of whether the "give a true and fair view" requirement is
identical to the "present fairly" requirement should be analyzed based on jurisdiction
"because the legal and linguistic context will affect the answer").
62.
Nobes, supra note 11, at 92.
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implications.6 3 Similarly, Katherine A. Schipper et al. compared two
alternative revenue recognition models then under consideration by
the FASB and IASB and, while emphasizing that both models were
based on contractual assets and liabilities, used the term law in their
article only once in passing. 64
Accounting regulators have sometimes stretched to find
alternatives to the term contract. For example, SAB No. 10465 uses
arrangement,defined as the "final understanding between the parties
as to the specific nature and terms of the agreed-upon transaction." 66
Similarly, the word contract, when it appears in accounting
literature, does not necessarily imply operation of law. For example,
IAS 32 defines contract as "an agreement between two or more
parties that has clear economic consequences that the parties have
little, if any, discretion to avoid, usually because the agreement is
enforceable by law," implicitly defining as "contracts" legally
unenforceable agreements. 6 7
Constituent commentary on the contract-law aspects of the ED
has been sparse and contradictory. While some commentators
expressed concerns regarding the contract-law focus of the ED and

See Steven M. Mintz, Proposed Changes in Revenue Recognition Under U.S.
63.
GAAP and IFRS, CPA J., Dec. 2009, at 34, 34-39; see also Ryerson, supra note 37
(noting the ED's enforceable contract criterion but omitting reference to law as the
required enforcement mechanism).
See generally Schipper, supranote 27.
64.
SAB No. 104, supra note 19, at 1-2.
65.
Id. at 10 n.3.
66.
13
INTERNATIONAL ACcOUNTING STANDARDS, supra note 3, standard 32
67.
(2012).
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ED 2010,68 references to those contract-law concerns are scarce in the
boards' published summaries of constituent comments.6 9
Some
commentators
acknowledge
the
law-accounting
relationship but seem unsure about how to address it. For example, a
June 2009 Financial Accounting Standards Committee (FASC) letter
argued that the new FASB-IASB revenue recognition standard
should define the term contract as a legally enforceable agreement. 70
Paradoxically, the FASC also asserted that (a) agreements are often
noncontractual or legally unenforceable, (b) other means of
enforcement (such as retaliatory expulsion from diamond-trading coops) might bind counterparties where courts cannot, and (c) those
"contracts" should also be accounted for under the ED. 7 ' A later,
scholarly version of the same FASC letter dropped the word legally,
while retaining the footnote reference to other means of enforcement,
thereby implying that enforceability by whatever means should be
enough to justify revenue recognition.72 That the FASC felt compelled

68.
See, e.g., Letter from the Inst. der Wirtschaftspriifer to the IASB, supra
note 16, at 18 (suggesting that the IASB adopt a single definition of contract); Letter
from the Fed. of European Accountants to the IASB TT 16-19 (Apr. 17, 2012), available
at
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175823880881&blob
header=application%2Fpdf&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs
(favoring
a
"reasonable expectation" test in place of the "too legalistic approach" of ED paragraph
35(b)(iii)); Letter from the Australian Accounting Standards Bd. to the IASB 28 (Nov.
1, 2010), available at http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=
MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blobwhere=1 175821647623&blobheader=application%2Fpdf
(suggesting that the ED address how contract terms and performance obligations
interact with local law); Letter from Grant Thornton Int'l Ltd. & Grant Thornton LLP
to the IASB 5 (Oct. 21, 2010), available at http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=
urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175821597817&blobheader
=application%2Fpdf (asking whether an entity would be required by contract terms or
local law to refund progress payments if the entity terminates the contract); Letter
from the Swedish Enter. Accounting Grp. to the IASB 4 (Oct. 18, 2010), available at
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=i
d&blobwhere=1175821608026&blobheader=application%2Fpdf
(asserting that the
ED's focus on legal title and its passage will undermine comparability because title
passes at different times in different jurisdictions).
69.
The word law appears only once in the summary of comments on ED 2010.
IASB & FASB, IASB-FASB STAFF PAPER: COMMENT LETTER SUMMARY-MAIN ISSUES

20 (2010), available at http://www.ifrs.org/Documents/RRAp3to3c.zip. Similarly, for the
ED, FASB & IASB, FASB-IASB STAFF PAPER: FEEDBACK SUMMARY FROM COMMENT
LETTERS AND
OUTREACH (2012), available at http://www.ifrs.org/Documents/

RRO512bO7A.PDF, highlights only two issues related to this paper: (1) whether
contract payment terms must be "specified" in the contract or, alternatively, whether
"general business practices and/or the legal environment in which the contract was
signed" may be considered in recognizing revenue, id. 35; and (2) how to account for
revenue from transactions or relationships that are not contracts with customers, id.
T 72.
70.
Letter from the FASB to the IASB 6, 12 (June 19, 2009), available at
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=i
d&blobwhere=1175819237972&blobheader=application%2Fpdf.
71.
Id. at 6 n.6.
72.
FASC, supra note 16, at 691 n.6.
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to argue for recognition in those circumstances supports the
contention that the ED's omission of those transactions or
relationships is a drafting deficiency.
In 2011, the FASC published a scholarly commentary critiquing
the ED 2010 as too vague and proposing a revenue standard-setting
framework that would entirely replace' it. 7 While the FASC's
proposal refers repeatedly to contracts and contractual performance,
it does not address in a meaningful way the interplay between
comparative contract law and revenue accounting.
Comments by the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) Institute's
Centre for Financial Markets Integrity suggest similar intellectual
conflict regarding the causal relationship between contract
negotiation and formation (on the one hand) and revenue recognition
and cash flow (on the other). The Institute recommended that the ED
explicitly define contract as a constructive obligation rather than as a
legally enforceable contract, 74 reasoning that constructive obligations
correspond to economic liability more closely than legally enforceable
contracts. 7 However, the Institute's letter does not define
constructive obligation, explain how constructive obligation is better
than a legally enforceable contract as an economic-liability surrogate,
or explain how delinking constructive obligation from legal
enforceability would improve the quality of financial reporting or
reduce confusion in the minds of financial statement readers.
One plausible interpretation of the constructive-obligation
concept is offered by game theory, which describes buyer-seller
relationships that are self-enforcing Nash equilibria. In Nash
equilibria, which may be fairly described as constructive obligations,
buyer and seller have individual economic incentives to honor their
contract, independent of judicial or other external enforcement. 76
In contrast to the expansive viewpoints of the FASC and CFA
Institute, the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group argued
that only with unilateral legal power to direct the use of and receive

73.
FASC, supra note 30, at 577-78.
Letter from the CFA Inst. to the IASB 12 (Oct. 22, 2010), available at
74.
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey-i
d&blobwhere=1175821813585&blobheader=application%2Fpdf.
Id.
75.
See JOEL WATSON, STRATEGY: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 139-41
76.
(2008) (explaining basic game theory in the legal context). Substituting "Nash
equilibrium" for "legally enforceable contract" in the ED would arguably improve the
internal consistency of IFRS by reconciling the ED's narrow revenue recognition rule
with the more liberal IFRS Conceptual Framework, which authorizes recognition when
"(a) it is probable that any future economic benefit associated with the item will flow to
or from the entity; and (b) the item has a cost or value that can be measured with
reliability." THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL REPORTING 1 4.38 (Int'l
Accounting Standards Bd. 2010) (emphasis added).
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the benefit from a good or service77 does a customer control that good
or service, thereby allowing the seller to meet a threshold ED
requirement for revenue recognition. 78 In other words, in the
European Financial Reporting Advisory Group's view, a purported
account receivable emanating from an obligation without legal force
should not be recorded in the financial statements.
The FASB-affiliated Private Company Financial Reporting
Committee (PCFRC) observed that ED paragraphs 13 and 24 state,
respectively, that (a) only legally enforceable contract rights and
obligations are recognizable but, conversely, (b) performance
obligations of the revenue-reporting entity need only create a valid
expectation in the customer's mind in order to be treated as separate
revenue recognition milestones.7 9 The PCFRC queried why a mere
valid expectation should be good enough to establish paragraph 24
recognition milestones, while supposedly more robust legal
enforceability is required for overall recognition under paragraph
13.80

Meanwhile, the International Auditing and Assurance Standards
Board questioned whether, because the ED's definition of contract
includes some unwritten agreements, auditors will be able to obtain
sufficient evidence to support management assertions regarding
revenue to be received.8 1 Counter-logically, the Board also questioned
how, in the absence of written agreements, auditors will be able to
verify the existence or nonexistence of undisclosed side agreements. 82

77.
See Letter from the European Fin. Reporting Advisory Grp. to the IASB 9
(Oct. 22, 2010), available at http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&
blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175821620447&blobheader=applicati
on%2Fpdf (noting that a customer's control over goods and services is a function of
contractual rights enforceable under relevant law).
78.
Id.
79.
Letter from the Private Co. Fin. Reporting Comm. to the FASB 1-2 (Feb.
10, 2012), available at http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable
=MungoBlobs&blobkey-id&blobwhere=1175823755909&blobheader=application%2Fpdf.
80.
This seeming contradiction was written into the ED because some
respondents to ED 2010 argued that some promises should be treated as performance
obligations even if unenforceable. See BASIS FOR CONCLUSIONS EXPOSURE DRAFT:

REVENUE FROM CONTRACTS WITH CUSTOMERS, ED/2011/6
BC33, BC63 (Int'l
Accounting Standards Bd. 2011) [hereinafter BASIS FOR CONCLUSIONS], available at
http://www.ifrs.org/Current-Projects/IASB-Projects/Revenue-Recognition/EDNovl1/
Documents/RevRecEDIIBC.pdf (describing contractual obligations). While not
technically part of the ED, the Basis for Conclusions (BC) summarizes the
considerations and reasoning that the FASB and IASB used in drafting it. See id. at 6
(explaining considerations taken during drafting); see also EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra
note 1, at 17; BASIS FOR CONCLUSIONS, supra BC1 (explaining that certain factors
were given more weight in drafting the ED).
81.
See Letter from the Int'l Auditing and Assurance Standards Bd. to the
FASB 8 (Mar. 19, 2012), available at http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?
blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175823829827&blo
bheader=application%2Fpdf (discussing how the increased use of significant judgments
makes it more difficult to obtain audit evidence).
82.

Id.
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In fact, side agreements are sometimes deliberately hidden from
auditors even when they are memorialized in writing.8 3 Therefore, it
appears that their existence or (especially) nonexistence should be
equally difficult to discover and document with or without
implementation of the ED.

II. REVENUE

RECOGNITION PROCESS

A. Overview
The stated objectives of the ED include (a) clarification of
revenue recognition principles, 84 (b) development of a common IFRS
and U.S. GAAP standard 85 applicable to most contracts with
customers,8 6 and (c) enhanced comparability of revenue recognition
practices across entities, industries, jurisdictions, and capital
markets. 87 More specifically, the ED seeks to clarify when to
recognize revenue, 8 8 how to measure revenue, 89 and what contract
information must be disclosed in the financial statements and how to
disclose it. 90 When to recognize revenue, in relation to contract
formation, is a major focus of this Article. The following discussion
divides the ED's revenue recognition process into two stages referred
to here as Stage 1 (contract analysis) and Stage 2 (recognition and
measurement).

See, e.g., SEC v. Koninklijke Ahold N.V. (2004) (SEC final order)
83.
(explaining that defendants allegedly delivered forged side letters to external auditors
to support consolidation of nonsubsidiaries while concealing actual side letters, which
contradicted the forgeries, from the auditors), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/litreleases/1rl8929.htm.
See EXPOSURE DRAFr, supra note 1, IN2 (stating the goals of the ED).
84.
85.
Id.
Beyond the scope of the ED are (a) lease contracts covered by IAS 17, (b)
86.
insurance contracts covered by IFRS 4, (c) contractual rights or obligations covered by
IFRS 9 and IAS 39, and (d) nonmonetary exchanges, between entities in the same lines
of business, executed for the purpose of facilitating sales to customers not parties to the
contract. Id. 9.
Id. IN2(c).
87.
Id. TT 12-48 (explaining how to read a contract to determine the revenue).
88.
While the Codification provides no generally applicable definition of financial
statements, the term typically refers to a collection of documents comprising a balance
sheet, income statement, and statement of cash flows, plus accompanying explanatory
notes. FASB CODIFICATION, supra note 2, subtopic 272-10-45-1.
See EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 1, TT 49-89 (explaining factors that must
89.
be considered when measuring revenue, including transaction price, time value of
money, and noncash considerations).
See id. TT 104-130 (detailing what information is required in the
90.
presentation of the contract).
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B. Stage 1: ContractAnalysis
1.

Contract Analysis Overview

The first stage of the ED's revenue recognition process, flow
charted in Figure 1, requires two related analytical steps: (a)
verification that a legally enforceable agreement exists within the
meaning of ED paragraphs 13 and 1591 and (b) verification, under
paragraph 14, that the legally enforceable agreement falls within the
scope of the ED. 92

91.
92.

Id.
Id.

13,15.
14.
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Figure 1
ED/2011/6 Revenue Recognition
Stage 1 - Contract Analysis
Purported contract w/
customer

STEP 1
Review purported contract
for legal enforceability
Verify contract is within
scope (ED para. 14)

(ED paras. 13 & 15)
Enforceability &existence
A. identify governing law &forum
(para. 13);
B. verify contract formation &validity
(para. 13);
C.verify contract enforceability
(para. 13); and
D.for wholly executory contracts,
verify that at least one party lacks the
enforceable right to unilaterally
terminate without penalty (para. 1)services
Pass ED

Para. 14 scope criteria
A. comnmercial substance/effect on future
cash fibws;
B. partie s approve and are committed to
perform
C. ident fication of parties' rights to goods/
; and
C. identification of payment terms

Yes

paras. 13&1
tests
j~oNo,

Do not recognize
revenue

2.

Yes
Go to Measurement &
Recognition Module
(Fig. 2)

Contract Existence

The existence of a legally enforceable contract presupposes a
contract validly formed under applicable law. Thus, paragraph 13
defines a contract as an agreement, whether written, oral, or implied
by the entity's customary business practices, that creates enforceable
rights and obligations.9 3 It describes enforceability as a matter of law,
with the understanding that practices and processes for establishing

See id. 1 13 (defining a contract for the purposes of the ED); see also BASIS
93.
FOR CONCLUSIONS, supra note 80, BC33 (defining contract in the ED).
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enforceable contracts vary among jurisdictions, industries, and
entities. 94 Paragraph 13 thus appears internally inconsistent: it
limits implied contracts to those implied by the entity's customary
business practice while noting, more liberally, that practices and
processes for establishing enforceable contracts may also vary by
jurisdiction or industry.
Paragraph BC32 of the ED's Basis for Conclusions affirms the
primacy of legal enforceability:
[T]he IASB decided not to adopt a single definition of a contract for both
IAS 32 and [the ED] because the IAS 32 definition implies that
contracts can include agreements that are not enforceable by law.
Including such agreements would be inconsistent with the boards'
decision that a contract with a customer must be enforceable by
law ... .95

The ED's emphatic legal enforceability requirement contrasts
with current SEC staff views and IASB guidance on the role of
contract enforceability in revenue recognition. SAB No. 104 endorses
a four-pronged revenue recognition test that requires persuasive
evidence of an arrangementbetween seller and buyer.96 To illustrate
the meaning of this phrase, SAB No. 104 describes a scenario,
discussed in the following paragraph, in which the term arrangement
resembles but does not necessarily equate to a legally binding
contract.9 7
Just before the seller's fiscal quarter end, a buyer places a
product order with a seller.9 8 Before the quarter's end, the seller
ships the product and signs a sales agreement to which the buyer's
purchasing department orally agrees but, pending final legal
department approval, does not sign. 9 While the purchaser's

94.
See EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 1, 13; see also BASIS FOR CONCLUSIONS,
supra note 80, BC33.
95.
BASIS FOR CONCLUSIONS, supra note 80,
BC32. Paragraph BC32 also
states that the definition of contract is "based on common legal definitions of a contract
in the United States." This reference to U.S. "definitions" appears to merit little
analytical weight because of its vagueness and because it is contradicted by the plain
language of ED paragraph 13 and BC paragraph BC33. Id. T BC33; EXPOSURE DRAFT,
supra note 1, 13; see also supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing IAS 32's
expansive definition of contract). However, it does raise questions regarding the
international bona fides of the ED and may create confusion in the minds of financial
statement preparers, auditors, readers, or regulators who lack expertise in U.S.
contract law.
96.
See SAB No. 104, supra note 19, at 10-11 (explaining how to determine
when revenue has been realized or is realizable). The remaining three prongs of SAB
No. 104 require delivery of goods or provision of services, fixed or determinable
transaction price, and reasonably assured collectability. Id.
97.
See id. at 12-14 (describing the difference between an arrangement and a
contract).
98.
See id. at 12 (providing a timeline for the scenario used to explain the
difference between an arrangement and a contract).
Id.
99.
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signature is said to be "highly likely" at the beginning of the next
quarter, 10 0 the seller's "normal and customary business practice for
this class of customer" requires a sales agreement signed by the seller
and buyer.' 01 On these facts, SAB No. 104 opines, despite the oral
agreement and the delivery of the product, that revenue recognition
should be postponed until the buyer signs because the seller's
customary business practice requires a customer-signed agreement
for revenue recognition, not because the agreement is not legally
binding.102

Perhaps because SAB No. 104 does not have the force of law, no
published SEC decision or other authoritative precedent has
explicitly interpreted persuasive evidence of an arrangement.
However, at least one SEC decision came close to doing so. In a 2007
enforcement action, the SEC found $5.5 million in revenues
improperly recorded where two purported contracts bound a reseller
to endeavor to resell software. 103 According to the SEC, merely
endeavoring to resell did not constitute a commitment sufficient to
justify revenue recognition.104
In the IFRS arena, IAS 18 does not refer to contracts or
arrangements,but authorizes revenue recognition when it is probable
that the reporting entity will receive the economic benefits associated
with a transaction.05 The remaining prongs of IAS 18 differ between
goods and services transactions. Both require that the amount of
revenue and associated costs be reliably measureable.106 For goods
sales, the seller must transfer to the buyer the risks and rewards of
ownership and relinquish managerial involvement and effective
control over the goods.' 0 7
The ED does not resolve debates among accounting practitioners,
regulators, and scholars as to the definition of contract or the role
contracts should play in revenue recognition. However, the ED seems
clear that contract enforceability is to be analyzed with reference to
the law governing the purported contract, except for legally

100.

Id.

101.
Id. While the SAB's language is imprecise, it would appear that SEC staff
expect readers to intuit that the seller's "customary business practice" is to recognize
revenue only once this class of customer signs a written sales agreement.
See id. at 13 (arguing that business practices require written, rather than
102.
oral, agreements).
In re Ernst & Young Chartered Accountants, 8-9 (2007) (SEC final order)
103.
(finding that Ernst & Young inadequately audited arrangements and agreements),
availableat http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2007/34-56104.pdf.
104.
Id.
105.

1

See INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS, supra note 3, standard 18

18 (explaining what conditions are necessary to recognize revenue).
Id. 11 18, 20.
106.
See id. 1 18 (describing sales transactions). Service transactions require
107.
that the transaction's stage of completion be reliably measureable. Id. T 20.
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enforceable contracts implied by facts other than the reporting
entity's own customary practices.
Beyond legal enforceability, ED paragraph 14 purports to further
limit the scope of the ED to enforceable contracts that meet the
following four additional tests:
(a) the contract has commercial substance (ie the risk, timing, or
amount of the entity's future cash flows is expected to change as a
result of the contract);
(b) the parties to the contract have approved the contract (in writing,
orally or in accordance with other customary business practices) and
are committed to perform their respective obligations;
(c) the entity can identify each party's rights regarding the goods or
services to be transferred; and
(d) the entity can identify the payment terms for the goods or services
1 08
to be transferred.

14(a) may reflect concerns about how
Subparagraph
jurisdictional legal diversity may impact the cash-flow prediction
properties of revenue, one of the primary functions of revenue
reporting.109 Additionally, though it does not do so expressly, it may
signal, probabilistically, that even a legally enforceable contract may
ultimately produce no cash flow because of legal-process anomalies or
other factors. Meanwhile, Nash equilibria seem ideally suited to the
"commited to perform" language of subparagraph 14(b).
While paragraphs 13 and 14 might seem sufficient to screen out
questionable but legally enforceable contracts, ED paragraph 15 goes
further, imposing a sixth test on what it terms wholly unperformed
contracts:
[A] contract does not exist if each party . .. has the unilateral
enforceable right to terminate a wholly unperformed contract without
compensating the other party (parties). A contract is wholly
unperformed if both of the following criteria are met:
(a) the entity has not yet transferred any promised goods or services to
the customer; and
(b) the entity has not yet received, and is not yet entitled to receive, any
110
consideration in exchange for promised goods or services.

The meaning of ED paragraph 15 and the results of its
interaction with ED paragraph 13 are unclear for three reasons.
First, paragraph 15 states that a contract does not exist if each party
has the unilateral enforceable right to terminate a wholly
unperformed contract without compensating the other party or

108.
109.
110.

EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 1, 1 14.
Id. 8.
15.
Id.
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parties.' 1 ' From a purely logical standpoint, no contract that fails this
paragraph 15 existence test can create enforceable rights or
obligations as required by paragraph 13. A purported contract that
frees each party from its so-called obligations offers no enforceable
rights to anyone and is, therefore, not a legally enforceable contract.
Therefore, arguably, paragraph 15 describes a null set.
Second, paragraph 15 circuitously defines wholly unperformed
contract as a contract in which the seller has transferred no goods or
services to the customer and has not received, and is not yet entitled
to receive, consideration in exchange.11 2 This presents a dilemma in
jurisdictions where mutual consideration is an essential contract
element. 113 In those jurisdictions, a so-called wholly unperformed
contract, in which consideration to the seller is absent, has no legal
validity; therefore, paragraph 15 is meaningless.
Third, assuming that paragraph 15 has some meaning, the ED
does not define the compensation for unilateral termination that
would bring an otherwise nonexistent, wholly unperformed contract
into existence. This drafting oversight also renders paragraph 15
inoperative.
Whatever the practical meaning of paragraph 15, Table 1
provides a high-level summary of the ED, IAS 18, and SAB No. 104,
highlighting differences among them. In reading Table 1, it should be
understood that these three views of revenue recognition differ
markedly in substance and style. Therefore, the topical equivalency of
verbiage in cells located in different columns on the same row may be
approximate, minimal, or nonexistent.

111.
Id.; see also Prentice, supra note 53 ("[A]greements that give the buyer total
discretion to return the product and consignment arrangements do not produce binding
contracts.").
112.
EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 1, 1 15 (emphasis added).
113.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1550 (1982) (describing the essential elements of
a contract); GA. CODE ANN. § 13-3-1 (2010) (stating the essentials of a contract).
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Table 1-ED, SAB No. 104 and L4S 18 Compared
ED

IAS 18

Legally enforceable contract
rights and obligations11 4

Probable that the
enterprise will receive
the economic benefits of
the transaction

Commercial substance (the
risk, timing, or amount of
the entity's future cash
flows is expected to change
as a result of the
contract)" 5
Parties have approved the
contract and are committed
to perform1 6

Seller has relinquished
managerial involvement
and control over goods

SAB 104
Persuasive
evidence of an
arrangement
between buyer
and seller
Delivery of goods
or provision of
services

Amount of revenue can
be reliably measured

Fixed or
determinable
transaction price

Enforceable rights of the
parties are identifiable 1 7

No similar concept

Reasonably
assured
collectability

Identifiable terms and
manner of payment" 8

Transaction-related costs
can be reliably measured

No similar concept

For wholly unperformed
contracts only, at least one
party lacks the unilateral
right to terminate the
contract without
compensating the
other(s)u 9

For services, stage of
transaction completion
can be measured
reliably; for goods, risks,
and rewards of
ownership transferred to
buyer

No similar concept

That ED paragraphs 13 and 14 explicitly require legal
enforceability, when IAS 18 and SAB No. 104 do not, raises questions
about revenue accounting for noncontractual relationships that are
economically committed or legally binding and recognizable under

12-13.
114.
EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 1,
115.
Id. 14(a).
116.
Id. 14(b). Paragraph 14(b) appears to conflict with paragraph 13 in that
the former accepts unwritten contract approval "in accordance with other customary
business practices," whereas the latter limits implied contracts to those arising from
"the entity's customary business practices." Id.
117.
Id.
14(c).
118.
Id. 14(d).
119.
Id. T 15.
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current standards or guidance to be superseded by the ED. 120
Whatever the outcomes for such relationships, implementation of the
ED may influence sellers to game the revenue recognition system by
emphasizing legal enforceability over other aspects of customer
relationships.
Having verified the contract's validity and enforceability under
the ED, the revenue recognition and measurement process begins in
earnest, as explained in Part II.C. However, before moving to
Part II.C, this Article highlights relationships not involving express
contracts, most of which lie beyond the scope of the ED and for which
no other accounting literature will provide authoritative guidance
after the ED becomes effective.
3.

Implied and Noncontract Obligations

In a variety of situations, counterparties may become legally
obligated or otherwise committed to perform in the absence of an
express, legally enforceable contract. These situations may be divided
into two general categories: contracts implied in fact and
noncontractual obligations.
For example, in some jurisdictions, pre- or extra-contractual
damages may be assessed under various good faith-related
doctrines. 121 In German jurisprudence, when one party induces
detrimental reliance by falsely leading another to believe there will
be a contract between them, the inducing party may be held liable,
via culpa in contrahendo, to make the other whole.122 In like manner,

120.
See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (detailing guidance to be
superseded by the ED); infra notes 137-139 and accompanying text (discussing
possible accounting options for transactions and relationships beyond the ED's scope).
See also Hill & King, supra note 48, at 910 (discussing the codification of a
121.
duty to act in good faith in the German Civil Code); R.J.P. Kottenhagen, Freedom of
Contract to ForcingParties into Agreement: The Consequences of Breaking Negotiations
in Different Legal Systems, 12 IUS GENTIUM 58, 74-77 (2006) (discussing various
good-faith doctrines in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Europe); Robert A.
Riegert, The West German Civil Code, Its Origin and Its Contract Provisions, 45 TUL. L.
REV. 48, 94-97 (1970) (explaining the historical application of duty of care in German
law). See generally Friedrich Kessler & Edith Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining
in Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 HARv. L. REV. 401
(1964) (discussing the German good-faith doctrine of culpa in contrahendo). Under
China's Uniform Contract Law Article 42(1), parties are prohibited from conducting
negotiations in bad faith under the false pretense of entering a contract. See Matheson,
supra note 6, at 348-49 (explaining the difference between Chinese and American
contract law regarding good faith); see also C. Stephen Hsu, Contract Law of the
People's Republic of China, 16 MINN. J. INT'L L. 115, 123 (2007) (explaining that
good-faith duties apply during preliminary negotiations and post-contractual rights
and duties, in addition to contract formation and performance). Similarly, under the
Italian Civil Code, negotiating parties must behave in good faith during the
precontractual bargaining and contract drafting. C.C. art. 1337 (It.).
See Hill & King, supra note 48, at 910 n.66 (stating that the first effective
122.
date of BGB § 311 II was Jan. 1, 2002); Hoffman, InterpretationRules and Good Faith
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the German Bilrgerliche Gesetzbuch imposes restitutionary liability
on a negotiating party who withdraws a manifestation of intent
(either offer or acceptance) after a counterparty has detrimentally
relied on that manifestation. 123 A similar doctrine is gaining traction
in the United States. 124 Similar results may also be achieved in some
U.S. jurisdictions through promissory estoppel or the quasi-contract
arm of quantum meruit.
Promissory estoppel sounds in culpa in contrahendo: a promise is
binding if injustice can be avoided only by its enforcement, when the
promisor should reasonably expect the promise to induce action or
forbearance by the promisee or a third person, and the promise does,
in fact, induce such action or forbearance. 125
In theory, quantum meruit comprises two distinct but related
doctrines: (1) quasi-contract (also called unjust enrichment or
contract implied in law), a noncontract remedy calling for
restitutionary damages equal to the value received by the defendant;
and (2) contract implied in fact, in which a valid contract is formed,
not by the parties' words, but by their conduct, for the breach of
which the appropriate measure of damages is the price intended by
the parties, or a reasonable market value when no price is expressed
by them. 126
A contract implied in law arises where the defendant receives a
benefit, and appreciates or knows of the benefit, under circumstances
making it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without

as Obstacles to the UK's Ratificationof the CISG and to the Harmonizationof Contract
Law in Europe, 22 PACE INT'L L. REV. 145, 160 (2010) (explaining that German courts
applied the good-faith principle as a bar against claims); Kessler & Fine, supra note
121, at 402 (indicating that the essence of culpa in contrahendo is that a "careless
promisor has only himself to blame when he has created for the other party the false
appearance of a binding obligation"); Kottenhagen, supra note 121, at 74-77
(discussing the historical origins of culpa in contrahendo and citing BORGERLICHES
GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896, § 241 11 and § 311 II (Ger.), for the
proposition that culpa in contrahendo is now codified in the German Civil Code).
123.
BORGERLICHEs GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896, § 122
(Ger.).
124.
Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, PrecontractualLiability and Preliminary
Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661, 664-65 (2007) (noting the recent emergence of a
legal rule requiring parties to preliminary agreements with open terms to bargain over
such terms in good faith or pay reliance damages to the other party).
125.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981) (defining
promissory estoppel); see also, e.g., Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267,
274-75 (Wis. 1965) (applying promissory estoppel where defendants induced plaintiffs
to sell their grocery store, fixtures, and inventory by falsely promising to build a new
store).
126.
See, e.g., Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah 1987) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 5 cmt. a (1981)); see also Candace S. Kovacic,
A Proposal to Simplify Quantum Meruit Litigation, 35 AM. U.L. REV. 547, 553-58
(1986) (explaining sources of confusion in quantum meruit litigation).
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paying for it,127 but only so long as the benefit is not gratuitously
conferred.128
Typically, a contract implied in fact arises where (1) the
defendant requests the plaintiff to perform work, (2) the plaintiff
expects the defendant to compensate plaintiff for the work, and (3)
the defendant knows or should know that the plaintiff expects
compensation.1 29 If these elements are present, the transaction would
be a contract within the scope of the ED, but only if recognizing
revenue in such a scenario is consistent with the seller's customary
business practices130 and the governing law adheres to this contractimplied-in-fact model. However, neither the ED nor the Basis for
Conclusions indicates whether a legally enforceable, implied-in-fact
contract would be recognizable if recognition proves inconsistent with
the seller's customary business practices. Either way, if the governing
law does not recognize a contract implied in fact under the
circumstances presented,13 1 then the transaction would lie outside
the ED's scope.
In practice, courts often misinterpret quasi-contract and contract
implied in fact by confusing the tWO132 or conflating them into a
monolithic quantum meruit hybrid. 133 For example, some
jurisdictions have imposed generic quantum meruit restitutionary
damages where: (1) valuable services are delivered to the defendant,
who either requests or knowingly accepts them, (2) the plaintiff
expects compensation at the time the services are rendered, and (c)
failure to compensate the plaintiff would be unjust.134 Thus, in Nextel

See Kovacic, supra note 126, at 554-55 (explaining legal actions in
127.
restitution); see also, e.g., Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553, 557 (Utah 1984) (using
"unjust enrichment" in place of "quasi-contract" or "contract implied in fact").
See Kovacic, supra note 126, at 554-55 (explaining that the plaintiff must
128.
not confer the benefit gratuitously if seeking restitution).
See, e.g., Davies, 746 P.2d at 268-69 (stating that the theory of quantum
129.
meruit presupposes that no enforceable written or oral contract exists).
See EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 1, 13 ("Contracts can be written, oral or
130.
implied by an entity's customary business practices.").
See, e.g., Michael C. Walch, Dealing with a Not-So-Benevolent Uncle:
131.
Implied Contracts with Federal Government Agencies, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1373-74
(1985) (noting that federal courts have rejected implied-in-fact contract claims on
"wooden, technical" grounds because, for example, a federal agency failed to follow its
own contracting procedures, omitted a required contract term, or accepted terms
different from published bid requests).
See Kovacic, supra note 126, at 547 n.23 (citing illustrative decisions by
132.
California, New York, North Carolina, and Texas courts).
See id. at 560-61 (explaining sources of confusion for courts and litigants
133.
regarding the theory of quantum meruit).
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Cortolano & Barone, Inc. v. Morano Constr.
134.
Corp., 724 F. Supp. 88, 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (describing how a subcontractor is entitled
to quantum meruit value of benefits provided to the prime contractor where both
parties expected the subcontractor would get part of a construction contract); Nextel S.
v. RA Clark Consulting, 596 S.E.2d 416, 419 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (describing how an
executive search firm sued an employer for breach of contract and quantum meruit).
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South v. RA Clark Consulting,the Georgia Court of Appeals upheld a
quantum meruit award of $15,000 to an executive search firm when
the parties did not sign a fee agreement, but the search firm placed
advertisements for the position and screened, evaluated, and
interviewed over three hundred candidates, including the winning
candidate who eventually resigned after working just over a
month.13 5
The concepts underlying implied or noncontractual obligations
dovetail with the CFA Institute's proposal to substitute constructive
obligation in place of legally enforceable contract, 136 evoking the
following IASB meeting colloquy between Henry Rees, then-IASB
Technical Principal on the Revenue Recognition Project, and James
Leisenring, then representing the United States at the IASB:
Leisenring: There's a couple of things about this [contract concept]
that trouble me. . . . [We spent an awful lot of time talking about
situations like the painter . . . where I don't think there was a contract.
So if you mean only when there is this contract that I can see I
signed . .. I don't even know how to make that distinction.
Rees: [B]y contract ... we did not mean a formal, signed document.
We did discuss whether the word arrangement would be better but . .. I
think we sort of agreed that contract translates better. . . . [So by
contract we just meant promises that would be enforceable . . .. [W]e
didn't mean, necessarily, that they have to be a written
contract . . . . [M]ost people don't think of a cash sale as being a written
contract.
Leisenring: But I'm afraid, I come from a jurisdiction that'll
translate contract-and I think some FASB board members-will
translate it very narrowly .... 137

Rees was not a member of the FASB or IASB and was not
speaking for either board. His statement that by contract, "we just
meant promises that would be enforceable," was uttered two years
before the issuance of ED 2010 and should not color the meaning of
the ED, which requires legally enforceable contracts on its face.
However, the colloquy highlights two competing interpretations of the
term contract prevalent in accounting circles.
At face value, revenues derived through promissory estoppel,
culpa in contrahendo, and quasi-contract fall outside the ED's
enforceable-contract scope. In contrast, SAB No. 104 and IAS 18 both
appear to accommodate at least some noncontract customer
relationships. When, how, or how much revenue to recognize from
transactions outside the ED's scope remains an open question.

135.
Nextel S., 596 S.E.2d 416 at 418.
136.
See supra note 74 and accompanying text (recommending that an explicit
articulation of a contract be a constructive obligation to avoid confusion with legal
obligations).
137.
Audio
MP3:
IASB
Meeting
(Jul. 22,
2008),
available at
http://media.iasb.org/AP6RevenueRecognition22072008.mp3.
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Under U.S. GAAP, one possible solution is offered by
Codification Subtopic 105-10-05-02, which states that when
transaction-specific guidance does not exist in the Codification (or, for
SEC registrants, SEC rules), the reporting entity must first consider
authoritative guidance for similar transactions and then turn to "nonauthoritative" sources. 138 With most transaction-specific guidance
superseded by the ED, the search for authority will likely loop back to
the broad, high-level theory of FASB Concepts Statement No. 5 and,
from there, to a d6jA vu rendezvous with SAB No. 104, assuming that
the SEC staff do not withdraw SAB No. 104.139
IFRS, on the other hand, appears to offer no similar escape
mechanism. The closest thing to it might be the so-called fair
presentation override of IAS 1, paragraph 19, which requires firms to
depart from or override detailed IFRS standards when management
concludes that compliance with IFRS would be so misleading as to
conflict with the IFRS Framework's financial statement objectives. 140
Under either U.S. GAAP or IFRS, the financial statement results
will likely vary depending on who searches for and interprets the
nonauthoritative sources.
C. Stage 2: Recognition and Measurement
The primary aim in discussing Stage 2 is to assist readers in
understanding the overall context in which the Stage 1 contract
analysis takes place. Like Stage 1, Stage 2 (flowcharted in Figure 2)
is intimately connected with contract law, as evidenced by the
frequent appearance of terms such as control, consideration,
performance, pledging, obligation, satisfaction, title, and ownership.
Exhaustive analysis of these connections is beyond this Article's
scope. However, the following commentary provides helpful
background.

FASB CODIFICATION, supra note 2, subtopic 05-10-05-2.
138.
See supra note 27 (discussing FASB Concepts Statement No. 5) and supra
139.
note 19 (discussing SAB No. 104).
140.

INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS, supra note 3, standard 1 T 19.
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Figure 2
ED/2011/6 Revenue Recognition
Stage 2 - Recognition & Measurement
(a) Identify separate
performance obligations
in the contract
ED paras. 23-30

Begin Recognition &
Measurement Module

Transaction price =
expected value or
most likely amount
of consideration to
be received. ED
paras. 52-55

.

Indicators of customer control
ED paras. 31-48
1. customer's unconditional obligation to pay for the good
or service;
2. shift of risks and rewards of ownership of goods; or
3. shift in legal title to or physical possession of the goods

Customer must
have the present
right to obtain
substantially all of
the cash flows
from the asset by
using, consuming,
selling,
exchanging,
pledging or holding
it.
ED paras. 31-32.

Does the customer >No
control the good or
service?

Do not recognize
revenue

Yes
Recognize Revenue

Stage 2 performs two functions. First, it tests the transaction to
ensure that revenue is recognized (meaning recorded in the financial
statements) only upon satisfaction of performance obligations
through transfer to the customer of the contracted goods or
services.' 4 1 Second, Stage 2 determines the transaction price of the
contract1 42 and, once transfer occurs, allocates the transaction price
to separate performance obligations under the contract. 143

141.

EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 1, T 31.

142.

Id.
Id.

143.

50.
70-80.
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Transfer occurs when control of the good or service shifts to the
customer. 144 A customer obtains control of a good or service when the
customer has the ability to direct the use of and receive related cash
flows, and to prevent others from doing SO. 1 4 5 Indicators of a shift in
control include the customer's unconditional obligation to pay for the
good or service, the transfer of legal title to or physical possession of
the good, or transfer to the customer of the risks and rewards of
ownership of the good. 146
Despite this required shift in control, which may indirectly
impose accounting symmetry between buyer and seller, neither IFRS,
nor U.S. GAAP, nor SEC regulations explicitly require symmetry. In
other words, in a given transaction, the seller may be permitted or
even required to recognize sales revenue under the seller's revenue
accounting standards, even if the buyer does not record the purchase
of the goods or services under the buyer's accounting standards. 147
Control has no accounting significance in the absence of a legally
enforceable contract, without which contract revenue cannot be
recognized. While it is not this Article's purpose to examine control in
detail, the discussion below suggests that the ED fails to account for
control-related contract-law complications in some jurisdictions. 148
The transaction price equals the amount of consideration to
which the reporting entity expects to be entitled in exchange for
transferring promised goods or services, 149 adjusted for discounts,
rebates, incentives, performance bonuses, contingencies, and similar
items. 150 For contracts that include a significant financing
component, the transaction price must be discounted to present
value. 151 The transaction price should not, however, be adjusted for
customer credit risk,' 5 2 which the ED describes as a collectability
question to be accounted for under other accounting standards. 5 3

144.
Id. T 31.
145.
Id. 32.
Id. 1 37.
146.
Readers seeking a citation to authority for this proposition will seek in
147.
vain. Because there is no authority positively requiring financial accounting symmetry,
it is not necessary to expressly authorize its negative. Outside of the financial
accounting arena, the "no symmetry required" rule fails, particularly in the context of
U.S. tax law. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 267(a)(2) (2006) (requiring symmetry in the
reporting of the income and deductions in some transactions between some
counterparties).
For discussion of the German principle of separation and abstraction, see
148.
infra notes 223-226 and accompanying text.
3, 50.
EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 1,
149.
Id. 1 54.
150.
Id. 58.
151.
IN17, 68-69. Credit risk is the risk that the reporting entity will be
Id.
152.
unable to collect the transaction price from the customer. Id.
Id. However, collectability may factor in Stage 1 contract analysis. Doubts
153.
about collectability may indicate that the customer's commitment to perform is less
than required for applicability under ED paragraph 14.
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While the term considerationappears in the ED 150 times, the
ED does not define it-either internally or by reference to external
authority. Similarly, the ED does not specify whether the term
expects is defined subjectively or objectively. However, on the surface,
ED paragraphs 3 and 50 both appear to describe what the entity
actually (subjectively) expects, not what a reasonable observer in the
entity's position should (objectively) expect. 154
A performance obligation is a seller's contractual promise to
transfer a good or service to the customer. 15 5 The transaction price
must be allocated to separate performance obligations, if any, in
proportion to their separate estimated or actual (if actually sold
separately) stand-alone selling prices. 156

III. ED APPLIED TO PRATT & WHITNEY-MALEV
This Part of the Article presents an actual transaction involving
a purported contract for the sale of jet engines, parts, related services,
and financing. The Article tests the purported contract for revenue
recognition purposes using the ED's analytical process presented in
Part II.

A. Fact Scenario:Jet Engine Transaction
Pratt & Whitney's (P&W's) 1990157 attempt to sell jet engines
and related services to Hungary's national airline, Malev, illustrates
how an open or uncertain price term may result in either a binding
contract or no contract depending on applicable law and its judicial
interpretation.
In the fall of 1990, P&W entered into negotiations with Malev for
the purchase of jet engines for two or three new airliners to be
manufactured by either Boeing or Airbus and replacement engines for

154.
The ED's discussion of transaction price appears to be internally
inconsistent. While ED paragraphs 3 and 50 used "expects to be entitled," EXPOSURE
DRAFT supra note 1,
3, 50, ED paragraph 49 states that where the consideration is
"variable," cumulative revenue should not recognized beyond the amount to which the
entity "is reasonably assured to be entitled," id. 49. Meanwhile, under the same
variable circumstances, ED paragraph 54 uses "will be entitled." Id. T 54.
155.
Id. T 24.
156.
Id. 71.
157.
Although it occurred over twenty years ago, the Pratt & Whitney-Malev
transaction remains a highly relevant illustration of issues and fact patterns that
continue to arise today in negotiating, drafting, and litigating international sales of
bundled goods and services. While it involved a bundle of tangible goods, services, and
financing, the scope of the ED also extends to sales of intangibles. Application of the
ED to a pure services or pure intangibles transaction will differ in some details from a
bundled goods and services transaction, but the core principles are the same for both.
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Malev's aging, Russian-built Tupolev airliners.15 8 On December 4,
1990, the parties signed a letter of intent for the replacement engine
component of the transaction, contingent on the signing of the new
airliner component.
During a meeting on December 14, 1990, P&W presented Malev
officials a detailed, fifteen-page proposed "Purchase Agreement"159
(the Proposal) according to which Malev would purchase (a) engines
for two new airliners and a call option 60 on engines for a third; (b)
one spare engine plus a call option on an additional spare; and (c) a
related service, maintenance, and spare parts "support" package.161
The Proposal also detailed credit terms that would accompany
Malev's engine purchase.' 6 2
Because Malev had not yet chosen between Boeing and Airbus
planes, the Proposal specified per-engine prices for each of three
alternative engine configurations: (1) for Boeing planes, the PW 4056
at $5,847,675 per engine; and (2) for Airbus planes, either the PW
4152 at $5,552,675 per engine, or the PW 4156/A at $5,847,675 per
engine.' 6 3 The quoted prices, however, omitted the engine nacelle 64
and other parts that would be required if Malev were to choose
Airbus.16 5 On December 21, 1990, P&W extended the PW 4056 quote
to the PW 4060 engine, should Malev choose Airbus over Boeing.166
Subsequently, on December 21, Malev responded to the Proposal
with a detailed written declaration of acceptance to the effect that
Malev would power its new airliners with PW 4000 series engines.16 7
As of December 21, however, Malev had not decided between Boeing

158.
Fdvirosi Bir6sAg [Metropolitan Court] Jan. 10, 1992, 3.G.50.289/1991/32
(Hung.), translated in Case II: Metropolitan Court Budapest, 13 J.L. & COM. 49, 52
(1993) [hereinafter Metropolitan Court].
Id.
159.
Malev was firm in its decision to purchase at least two new airliners but
160.
also intended to purchase a call option on a third airliner, regardless of whether the
airliners were manufactured by Boeing or by Airbus. Id. at 64. A call option is an
option contract granting the holder of the option the right to buy the good or service at
the "strike price" stated in the option contract. Call Option, OPTIONS GUIDE,
http://www.theoptionsguide.com/call-option.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).
Paul Amato, U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
161.
Goods-The Open Price Term and Uniform Application:An Early Interpretationby the
Hungarian Courts, 13 J.L. & COM. 1, 12-13 (1993).
F6virosi Bir6sdg, 3.G.50.289/1991/32, translated in Metropolitan Court,
162.
supra note 158.
163.
Amato, supra note 161, at 13.
An engine nacelle is a housing in which the jet engine sits and by which it
164.
is attached to the fuselage of the aircraft. Id. at 13 n.56.
165.
Legfels6bb Bir6sAg (LB) [Supreme Court] Gf.I.31.349/1992/9 (Hung.),
translatedin Case I: The Supreme Court of the Republic of Hungary, 13 J.L. & COM. 31,
41 (1993) [hereinafter HungarianSupreme Court].
F6vArosi Bir6sig, 3.G.50.289/1991/32, translated in Metropolitan Court,
166.
supra note 158, at 66-67.
Id. at 70.
167.
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and Airbus.168 Eight days later, on December 29, Malev announced
its decision to buy Boeing planes.' 6 9
Through February 1991, the parties continued to dialogue
regarding sale-related advertising, choice of a Hungarian enginemaintenance partner, and spare parts. 170 On March 25, Malev
abruptly reversed its P&W jet purchase decision, sending P&W a
letter characterizing it as "not likely" that Malev would purchase
P&W engines. 17 ' After negotiations broke down, P&W sued to enforce
the agreement.' 72
The Proposal's choice-of-law clause designated the Connecticut
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) as the law governing the
contract. 173 This clause, coupled with Hungarian law upholding
contractual choice-of-law clauses, 174 might seem to require
application of the Connecticut UCC.1 75 However, prior to a September
20, 1991, hearing before the Metropolitan Court of Budapest, P&W
voluntarily abandoned the Connecticut UCC in favor of the UN
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(CISG).' 76 Why P&W chose the CISG over the Connecticut UCC is
unclear. Whatever the rationale, the choice appears to have doomed
P&W's breach-of-contract claim against Malev.
B. ContractAnalysis: Legal Enforceability
Revenue recognition analysis of the P&W-Malev transaction
must begin by determining whether it presents a contract enforceable
under applicable law. In discussing applicable law, this Article will
refer to both substantive and procedural law. Substantive law defines
the contract rights and obligations of the parties. Procedural law
defines the legal process by which the parties' substantive rights and
obligations may be enforced if a party breaches.
Most jurisdictions generally permit parties to choose the law
governing their contract and the forum in which disputes should be

168.
Amato, supra note 161, at 14.
169.
Id.
170.
Id.
171.
F6virosi Bir6sdg, 3.G.50.289/1991/32, translated in Metropolitan Court,
supra note 158.
172.
Id. at 49.
173.
Amato, supra note 161, at 14 n.58.
174.
F6virosi Bir6sig, 3.G.50.289/1991/32, translated in Metropolitan Court,
supra note 158, at 53 (quoting 13/1979. (VII.1) Korm. r. a nemzetkazi magdnjogr61
(Law Decree No. 13/1979 (VII.1) on Private International Law) (Hung.)).
175.
Id.
176.
Amato, supra note 161, at 14 n.58; see also F6virosi Bir6sdg,
3.G.50.289/1991/32, translated in Metropolitan Court, supra note 158, at 53 (explaining
that the Hungarian translation of the UCC was dispensed with because the parties
agreed on the applicable substantive law).
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decided. 177 However, if the parties do not choose or if enforcement of
their choice would be unreasonable, unjust, or would contravene a
strong public policy of the dispute resolution forum, applicable law
will typically be chosen for the parties by treaty, statute, court, or
arbitrator using principles of private international law or conflicts of
law.' 7 8
In most jurisdictions, substantive legal enforceability requires
1 79 and absence of
presence of the basic elements of a valid contract
valid defenses against the contract's enforcement. 180 Once
substantive legal enforceability is established, further questions arise
in relation to procedural and practical enforceability. In jurisdictions
lacking the necessary legal infrastructure, it is possible that a legally
enforceable contract may be practically unenforceable because
judicial or enforcement capacity or willpower is lacking.' 8 ' Similarly,
a court judgment or arbitral award has no economic value if assets
are unavailable to satisfy it. A detailed analysis of procedural and
practical enforcement issues goes beyond this Article's scope;
however, it is important to note that legal enforceability is only the
first step along a winding, uncertain path toward contract
enforcement through legal process.

a7

See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 591-93 (1991)
177.
(upholding a forum-selection clause in a cruise line's routine commercial carriage
contract with an individual passenger); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S.
1, 12-16 (1972) (stating that, in general, freely negotiated agreements-including
forum-selection clauses-unaffected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening
bargaining power should be honored absent a strong contrary showing).
See, e.g., The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15-17.
178.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1550 (1982) (listing the elements of a valid
179.
contract under California law: (a) parties capable of contracting, (b) their consent, (c)
lawful object, and (d) sufficient cause or consideration); GA. CODE ANN. § 13-3-1 (2010)
(listing the contract elements under Georgia law: (a) parties able to contract, (b) a
consideration moving to the contract, (c) assent of the parties to the terms, and (d)
subject matter upon which the contract can operate); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1981) ("[T]he formation of a contract requires a bargain in which
there is manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration.");
Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Law Now-Reality Meets Legal Fictions, 41 U. BALT. L.
REV. 1, 9 (2011) (explaining that contract validity requires the meeting of "contract
law's formation requirements").
at
See, e.g., CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] arts. 1109, 1110, 1111, 1116 (Fr.), translated
180.
22
.pdf
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/content/download/1950/13681/version/3/file/Code_
(last visited Jan. 21, 2013) (providing that error, duress, and deception may be defenses
to the consent element of a contract in appropriate circumstances).
For example, delays in hearing and resolving contract cases in Italy can
181.
have the practical effect of making theoretically enforceable agreements practically
unenforceable. This phenomenon is illustrated by a case involving the sale of "artistic
goods" in which the plaintiff first filed a complaint in the court of original jurisdiction
on November 21, 1985, and the Italian Supreme Court (Corte Suprema di Cassazione)
finally found the contract valid on May 8, 2006. Cass. civile, sez. III, 8 maggio 2006, n.
10503 (It.). See generally Matheson, supra note 6 (discussing the unpredictability of
legal outcomes in China stemming from cultural and legal infrastructure anomalies).
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For the contract-analysis portion of this Article, jurisdictions
were chosen to demonstrate differences in contract law (a) among
fellow states of the European Union (represented by France,
Germany, and Italy), (b) between the European Union and the
Americas (represented by the United States and Colombia), (c)
between individual country laws and international law (represented
by the CISG), and (d) between conflicting interpretations of
international law rendered by different courts of the same country
(represented by the opposing decisions of the Metropolitan Court of
Budapest and the Hungarian Supreme Court).
The selected jurisdictions share a common political pedigree, as
current members of the European Union or former colonies of current
EU members. Nevertheless, their shared political heritage belies
differences in substantive contract rights and obligations, as well as
procedural law governing their judicial vindication. The differences
stem from a variety of historical factors including (a) the English
Civil War, the aftermath of which strengthened the legislative power
of English courts; (b) the Napoleonic backlash against the judiciary,
which stripped French courts of legislative power; (c) the
dissemination of Napoleonic civil law over much of Continental
Europe; and (d) the spread of English-style common law 182
throughout the former British Empire.' 83
An example of procedural law with potentially substantive
consequences is the variously observed tradition among civil-law
jurisdictions, unlike common-law ones,184 that courts generally lack
the authority to create law by establishing binding precedent. 85 For
example, France's Supreme Court (Cour de cassation) technically
does not possess precedent-setting authority. 186 Nevertheless, a
decision by the Cour de cassation (especially the rapport objectif
written by the justice chosen as case rapporteur) is viewed as

182.
English common law is distinguished from das gemeine Recht (the
Justinian Roman common law), which is the most important antecedent of German
civil law. Riegert, supra note 121, at 49.
183.
See generally Daniel Klerman & Paul G. Mahoney, Legal Origin?, 35 J.
COMP. EcoN. 278 (2007) (explaining the historical divergences that led to the current
systemic differences between countries whose legal systems are based on English
common law and those whose systems are based on French civil law).
184.
Mitchel de S.-O.-1'E. Lasser, The European Pasteurizationof French Law,
90 CORNELL L. REV. 995, 1003 (2005) ("[T]he American system traditionally grants its
judges explicit honest-to-goodness lawmaking power-as evidenced by the term 'case
law,' for which there is, quite tellingly, no French equivalent. . . .").
185.
Klerman & Mahoney, supra note 183, at 288 ("Napoleon enacted his Code
in part to eliminate judges' power to make law. . .. Revulsion at judicial power was so
strong after the Revolution that judges were initially forbidden even to interpret law.
Instead, they were required to refer ambiguous cases to the legislature . . . .").
186.
Lasser, supra note 184, at 1008-09 ("[O]nly the political branches of
government can produce law. Judges must not usurp this... lawmaking power,
because to do so would violate the most fundamental premise of a republican form of
government." (emphasis omitted)).
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persuasive guidance that, despite its technically nonbinding status,
87
lower courts tend to follow in order to avoid reversal on appeal.'
Whatever their genesis, the presence of these legal differences
among modern European countries and their political descendants
suggests that even greater differences prevail between Euro-centric
jurisdictions and non-European ones. Some of these differences will
be discussed in the following paragraphs.
1.

European Union

Comparative law scholars regard German and French law as the
two pillars of the civil-law system, 188 around which the other
89
members of the civil-law family have evolved. While Germany and
France are both known as civil-law jurisdictions, their laws have
90
developed differently, sometimes even in opposition to each other.1
German and French law, in contrast to English common law, are
derived to some degree from Roman law.191 The French Civil Code

Id. at 1009, 1050-63 (explaining that "only an incompetent attorney" would
187.
fail to consider rapport objectif of the Cour de cassation, of which 150-200 have been
published annually in response to the European Court of Human Rights decision in
Kress v. France, 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1). See generally JOHN BELL ET AL., PRINCIPLES
OF FRENCH LAW 26, 30 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing the role of French courts in French
law). Rapport objectif is the work product of the conseiller rapporteur. See6 Lexique,
COUR DE CASSATION, http://www.courdecassation.fr/informations-services- /charte
(last visited Feb. 16, 2013)
justiciable 2544/annexes_2551/lexique_10967.html
(defining rapport).
The idea of grouping countries in legal families originated with
188.
Montesquieu, see PETER DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 26 (2d ed.
2004), and continues today, see RENt DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL
SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 22 (3d ed. 1985). See generally KONRAD ZWEIGERT &
HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (Tony Weir trans., 3d rev. ed.
1998).

The French Civil Code and the BGB have served as the basis for statutory
189.
codifications in many other jurisdictions. See MICHAEL H. WHINCUP, CONTRACT LAW
AND PRACTICE: THE ENGLISH SYSTEM, WITH SCOTTISH, COMMONWEALTH, AND
CONTINENTAL COMPARISONS 37 (6th ed. 2006) (explaining that contract law in Belgium,
Holland, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Egypt, Louisiana, Quebec,
and the states of South America is modeled after the Napoleonic Code of 1804); Riegert,
supra note 121, at 58 (stating that the codes of Thailand, Japan, Greece, Brazil, and
Peru are influenced by the BGB). Even the UCC followed in most U.S. jurisdictions
borrows from the BGB. See Riegert, supra note 121, at 54 n.34 (noting that UCC § 2403(2) partially adopts BGB §§ 932-935 in relation to good-faith acquisition of property
from a person without title). The University of Ottawa JuriGlobe World Legal Systems
Research Group provides a high-level classification of legal systems employed in
countries around the world. See Alphabetical Index of the Political Entities and
Corresponding Legal Systems, JURIGLOBE, http://www.juriglobe.caleng/sys-jurilindexalpha.php (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).
See James Whitman, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on
190.
Llewellyn's German Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J. 156, 159
(1987) (describing a period of German opposition to Roman law).
See Riegert, supra note 121, at 49-50, 56 ("The most important antecedent
191.
of German civil law was undoubtedly the Roman common law .... ); Catherine Valcke,
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merged the droit 6crit (written law derived from Roman law) and
existing coutumes (customary law),1 92 and reflects strong moral and

ethical values. 9 3 It is praised for its conceptual clarity and elegant
style, in part because Napol6on Bonaparte wanted the Code written
for the people in a manner that lay people could understand.194
In contrast, the Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) was written for
experts by experts1 95 steeped in the German legal tradition, which
was influenced by the nineteenth-century Pandectist movement,
which itself was rooted in Roman law. 196 The resulting law is
conceptual, systematic, and largely free of ethical, moral, or religious
considerations.19 7 The BGB differs markedly from the French Civil
Code in style, structure, and sometimes substance, as the following
survey of the law on open-price terms illustrates.
a.

France

Under the French Civil Code, Malev's acceptance letter would
not have created an enforceable contract on December 21, 1990, but
arguably would have done so on December 29, 1990. It would not
have been enforceable on December 21 because the P&W Proposal on
which Malev's acceptance was based did not adequately specify the
price of the engine nacelle or other parts that would be required if
Malev were to choose Airbus over Boeing. This pricing ambiguity was
effectively cured on December 29, 1990, when Malev, without
renouncing its December 21 acceptance, chose Boeing planes, thereby
rendering the price of the transaction objectively determinable.
The French Civil Code requires four conditions for contractual
validity: (1) consent of the party to be bound, (2) the bound party's
capacity to contract, (3) a definite object or subject matter of the
undertaking, and (4) a lawful cause of the obligation.' 98 The contract
must have for its object a thing determined, at least as to kind. While
the quantity may be uncertain, it must be determinable.1 99

Comparative History and the Internal View of French, German, and English Private
Law, 19 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 133, 149 (2005) (explaining that the drafters of
the BGB sought to "preserve both the facts of German history and the written Reason
of Roman law").
192.
See DE CRUZ, supra note 188, at 63.
193.
Id. at 66.
194.
See 1 P.A. FENET, RECUEIL DES TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES DU CODE CIVIL 3
(1836) (Fr.) (affirming the need for the Civil Code to be easily understood, given that
the legislature works for the people and should therefore speak directly to the people).
See DE CRUZ, supra note 188, at 86.
195.
196.
Id. at 81.
Id.
197.
at
1108
(Fr.),
translated
CIVIL
[C.
Civ.]
art.
198.
CODE
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/content/download/1950/13681/version/3/file/Code_22.pdf
(last visited Jan. 21, 2013).
199.
Id. art. 1129.
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While French courts once required pricing certainty in nearly all
contracts, 200 the Cour de cassationdetermined in 1995201 that parties
to a contrat cadre de distribution (long-term supply contract) can
validly set future prices under a contract by reference to the
supplier's normal contract rate, as long as the rate is not abusive. 202
Since the 1995 decision, subsequent cases have confirmed that this
jurisprudence endorsing indefinite prices also applies to some other
long-term contracts, such as for the delivery of gasoline between an
oil company and a gas station, 203 delivery of beer to a restaurant, 204
rental and maintenance of telephone equipment, 205 and loans. 206
The principle applicable to long-term agreements does not
extend to the one-time delivery of goods. 207 In those sales contracts,
the price must be stated by the partieS208 or, alternatively, left to the
estimation of a third person designated by them. 209 However, when
the third person is unwilling or unable to estimate, the contract
fails. 210 This implies that the price must either be determined or

200.
Id. art. 1591; see also Edward A. Tomlinson, JudicialLawmaking in a Code
Jurisdiction:A French Saga on Certainty of Price in Contract Law, 58 LA. L. REV. 101,
102 (1997) (explaining that Article 1591 requires the price to be fixed and stated by the
parties); Arrits du ler Ddcembre 1995 Rendus par lAssemblge Pldnidre: Extraits de la
Note de Madame le Conseiller Fossereau [Excerpts of the Notes of Madame le Conseiller
Fossereau], COUR DE CASSATION, http://www.courdecassation.fr/publications-cour26/
bulletininformationcourcassation27/bulletinsinformation_1996_755/no_422_766/j
urisprudence_767/courcassation_770/arretpublieintegralemenL1672.html
-(last
visited Feb. 16, 2013) (Fr.) (addressing in depth the development of French
jurisprudence on open-price terms).
201.
Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] ass. pldn.,
Dec. 1, 1995, Bull. civ. A.P. No. 7, at 13, note Aynbs (Fr.).
202.
See id. (holding that a contract was not void for indeterminacy of price
where there was no reason to believe that the contested fees could not be predicted
based on benchmark values); see also BELL ET AL., supra note 187, at 316 ("[I]n 1995
the Assembl~e plinibre divorced these two issues and roundly declared that parties to a
long-term supply contract could validly set its future prices by reference to the
supplier's normal contract rate .... ). In the immediate aftermath of the 1995 decision,
one commentator speculated that its liberalization of indefinite price would extend to
all sales contracts. Tomlinson, supra note 200, at 102-03.
203.
Tomlinson, supra note 200, at 120.
204.
Id. at 131.
205.
Cour de Cassation, Bull. civ. A.P. No. 7, at 13 (Fr.).
206.
Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] le civ., Jun.
14, 2000, Bull. civ. I, No. 184 (Fr.); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial
matters] com., Jul. 9, 1995, JCP 1996, II, 22721, obs. Stoufflet (Fr.).
207.
It might, however, apply to the related services and spare-parts elements of
the purported P&W-Malev contract.
208.
CODE
CIVIL
[C.
CIV.]
art.
1591
(Fr.),
translated at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/content/download/1950/13681/version/3/file/Code-22.pdf
(last visited Jan. 21, 2013).
209.
Id. art. 1592.
210.
Id.
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determinable. 211 In this connection, French law voids contracts
subject to so-called potestative conditions, 212 which condition the
validity of an agreement on the occurrence of an event that one of the
contracting parties has the unilateral power to make occur or
prevent. 213
The purported December 21 P&W-Malev agreement does not
state a fixed price. Whether the price could be determined is
questionable because, as of Malev's December 21 acceptance, it was
still possible that Malev could choose Airbus planes for which P&W
had provided an incomplete price term by omitting the price of the
nacelle and other parts. While one could argue that the agreement
stated an engine-only price tied to Malev's choice between Boeing and
Airbus, that price was nevertheless unilaterally determinable by
Malev and was, therefore, a potestative condition rendering the
P&W-Malev contract invalid.
Consequently, under French law, a valid contract would have
been formed only as of December 29, 1990, when Malev announced its
decision to buy Boeing planes, thus narrowing its engine alternatives
to the unadorned PW 4056 or PW 4060, both of which were priced at
$5,847,675 per engine.
b.

Germany

Taken together with Malev's December 21 acceptance, Malev's
December 29 choice of Boeing planes would form a valid contract
under German law. In fact, the December 21 acceptance alone
probably would have been sufficient.
Compared to French law and Colombian law, the BGB takes an
expansive view of contract formation, requiring nothing more than
declarations of will from at least two persons who agree with each
other. 214 In contrast to the French Civil Code and English common law,
the BGB requires no consideration, object, or cause to form a valid
contract.2 15 Price is an essential element of sale-of-goods contracts. 216
However, non-sale-of-goods contracts need no price to be enforceable.21 7

211.
See LAMY, DROIT DU CONTRAT 215-21 (2010) (presenting examples where
contracts were held to be valid because the price of the isolated sale could be
determined using various objective indicia).
212.
C. CIv. art. 1174.
213.
Id. art. 1170.
214.
See BURGERLICHEs GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896,
§§ 145-155 (Ger.) (defining what constitutes an offer and the circumstances that will
make an acceptance binding).
215.
See RAYMOND YOUNGS, ENGLISH, FRENCH & GERMAN COMPARATIVE LAW
512 (2d ed. 2007).
216.
See BGB § 433 (stating that the purchaser must pay an agreed-upon
purchase price).
217.
On the price question, the BGB differentiates between contracts for the sale
of goods and other contracts, including sales of services and donations. See HANS-
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Even in sale-of-goods contracts, the price requirements are low: it is
required only that the price can somehow be gathered from the formal
agreement between the parties 2 1 8 the underlying circumstances, 219 or
objective criteria in connection with the agreement. 220 The parties may
also refer to external market information in setting the contract
price.2 21 Unstated price terms may be clarified through statutory gap
fillers, amendments by the court consistent with what the parties
would reasonably have intended if they had considered price, or the
parties' own subsequent agreement. 222
When the price is not clearly stated, the prevailing market price
at the place and time of delivery is presumed-or, in the absence of a
market price, a price at which the item would generally sell in the
same geographical area at the time of delivery.2 23 Finally, German
law expressly allows one party or the other to unilaterally determine
the price promised, so long as the price is equitable.2 2 4 If the price so
determined is inequitable, the court is authorized to set an equitable
price.22 5
Applying these standards, Malev's December 21 acceptance
letter established a binding contract because P&W's Proposal
provided sufficient objective mechanisms for resolving any price
ambiguity. The Proposal empowered Malev to unilaterally determine
the price by choosing between Boeing and Airbus; therefore, the exact
price was determinable. Even if Malev chose Airbus planes, for which
P&W's offer did not price the engine nacelle or other parts, the

WERNER ECKERT ET AL., HANDBUCH DES KAUFRECHTS 373 (2007) (stating that a sales
contract need not spell out an explicit price to be enforceable).
218.
ECKERT ET AL., supra note 217, at 373 (stating that a sales contract will be
enforceable so long as a price can reasonably be gleaned from the context of the
transaction); J. VON STAUDINGER, KOMMENTAR ZUM BORGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH, MIT
EINFOHRUNGSGESETZ UND NEBENGESETZEN § 433, at 3 (12th ed. 2005) (quoting
Beckmann).
219.
See BGB §§ 133, 157 (mandating that contractual interpretation take
account of the circumstances surrounding the disputed provision instead of relying on a
literal interpretation of the text); see also HS. TH. SOERGEL & W. SIEBERT,
BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH: MIT EINFUHRUNGSGESETZ UND NEBENGESETZEN 137
(13th ed. 1999) (quoting Huber).
220.
See STAUDINGER, supra note 218, at 53 (quoting Beckmann);
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Dec. 13, 1989, 43 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr [NJW] 1902 (1903), 1990 (Ger.) (supporting a holding on
a disputed contract by examining the text of the contract, relevant trade customs,
witness testimony, and the financing arrangements surrounding the contract).
221.
See Amato, supra note 161, at 20 (explaining that parties need not be
bound by data contained within the contract when setting the price).
222.
See id. at 19 (listing ways of legally supplying missing prices for a contract).
223.
See id. at 20 (explaining how the price will be determined if the contractual
price term is ambiguous).
224.
See BGB §§ 315-316 (laying out the rules that apply when a contract allows
one party to set a term of the contract, including the price term).
225.
See id. § 315 (providing that if a party abuses its power to set a contract
term, the courts will step in to set that term).
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contract would be valid because German law, unlike French or
Colombian law, would fill this gap with reference to P&W's normal
pricing practices or market prices, either when Malev chose the plane
manufacturer or upon delivery of the engines. Therefore, assuming
that all other contract elements are present, the jet engine purchase
agreement would be enforceable against Malev as early as December
21.
Here it is worth noting a German contract law principle,
separationand abstraction,which relates to the ED's Stage 2 transfer
and control test. Separation and abstraction strictly separates the
contract for the sale of goodS 226 from the transfer of title to the goods
themselves. 227 The practical effect of separation and abstraction is
that a customer may take title to a good even if the underlying sales
contract is void. 228 However, the customer's ownership of the goods
may be challenged retroactively under restitutionary principles.229
The possibility that title may legally shift to a customer despite
the void status of the sales contract raises questions regarding
accounting treatment under the ED. The ED requires an enforceable
contract as a prerequisite to revenue recognition. Therefore, in a
buyer-seller relationship subject to the principle of separation and
abstraction, it would be possible for the seller to be simultaneously
divested of title to the goods, yet unable to recognize revenue from the
sale because an enforceable contract is lacking. This Article does not
examine the details of the principle of separation and abstraction;
rather, it points to it as an illustration of how the ED might be
improved by dialogue between accounting-standards setters and
contract-law experts.
c.

Italy

Under the Italian Civil Code, Malev's December 21 acceptance
letter would most likely create an enforceable agreement because the
missing price term, if any, could be filled by the price at which P&W
normally sells the PW 4000-model engines or systems Malev later
decides to buy.

226.
See id. § 433 (setting forth the obligations incurred by the parties to a sales
contract, including the obligation to transfer title).
227.
See id. § 929 (explaining what a transfer of title involves; a valid contract is
not part of the formula).
228.
See CROSS-BORDER SECURITY OVER RECEIVABLES 94 (Harry C. Sigman &
Eva-Maria Kieninger eds., 2007) (explaining that the state of a sales contract is
completely irrelevant to the operation of a title transfer, though the sales contract
might obligate a party to perform a title transfer).
229.
See BGB §§ 812-822 (setting forth the rules applicable to restitution
claims).
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Case law or precedent, in the common-law sense, generally does
not exist under Italian law, 230 in that Italian judicial decisions have
no formal authoritative force in subsequent cases. 231 The ultimate
source of authority on sources of Italian law, Article 1 of the
Disposizioni sulla legge in generale, pointedly omits judicial decisions,
expressly including only statutes, regulations, and usages as sources
of legal authority. 232 Under Italian law, a usage is a uniform behavior
engaged in by a political, geographic, or industrial subgrouping for a
time period sufficiently long to create the presumption of legality and
is binding if not contradicted by another source of law. 233 Usages are
sometimes codified in collections edited by chambers of commerce or
by the Italian Ministry for Industry and Trade.234
In applying statutes to specific cases, Italian courts must
interpret the statutes as they are written, but are permitted to reason
by analogy from the statutory language to resolve interstitial or
peripheral questions. 235 Additionally, despite their formal disregard
of precedent, lower Italian courts tend as a practical matter to respect
the decisions of higher courts, particularly those of the Corte di
Cassazione, Italy's highest court for commercial matters. 236 Thus, the
Italian judiciary plays an informal role in shaping Italian law. 237

See Erika Arban, Note, The Doctrine of Strict Compliance in the Italian
230.
Legal System, 23 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 77, 79-80 (2005) (explaining the position
of previously decided cases in the hierarchy of Italian legal authority).
See id. at 80 (explaining that Italian courts are not bound by prior
231.
decisions); Marinella Baschiera, Introduction to the Italian Legal System. The
Allocation of Normative Powers: Issues in Law Finding, 34 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 279,
317 (2006) ("[The Italian legal system does not treat case law as a formal source of
law.").
See CODICE CIVILE [ITALIAN CIVIL CODE] [C.c.] art. 1 (It.), available at
232.
http://www.ilcodicecivile.it (setting forth the sources of legal authority under Italian
law).
See Arban, supra note 230, at 80-81 (explaining the definition and legal
233.
authority of a usage under Italian law). An examination of industry or regional usages
might reveal different perspectives on the issue of open-price terms.
See id. at 80 (explaining how usages come into written form).
234.
Silvio Martuccelli, The Right of Publicity Under Italian Civil Law, 18 Loy.
235.
L.A. ENT. L. REV. 543, 546 (1998) ("[C]ourts can look to existing ... [statutes] and
'reason by analogy' to apply [statutory] principles . . . to the present situation."); see
also C.C. art. 12 (laying out the method of statutory interpretation that courts must
use).
See Arban, supra note 230, at 80 (explaining the role prior decisions play in
236.
the Italian judicial system). This respect, however, must be tempered by the realization
that it typically takes so long for a case to wend its way through the Italian courts that
the judge in the original case may be retired or dead by the time his or her opinion is
reversed. See, e.g., Cass. civile, sez. III, 8 maggio 2006, n. 10503 (It.), which took the
Italian courts twenty-one years to resolve.
See Baschiera, supra note 231, at 317 (noting that judiciary opinions
237.
constitute substantive law applicable to the case in question, but judges can effectively
shape the law concerning the subject under consideration).
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Under the Italian Civil Code, the essential elements of a
contract 238 are (a) the agreement of the parties; (b) cause; (c) a
possible, lawful, and determinable contract objective;2 39 and (d) the
specific form required by law, if any, as in transfers of real estate. 240
Lacking any one of these elements, the contract is void.24 1Cause is
interpreted as the socioeconomic basis of the contract. 24 2 In contracts
for the sale of goods or other legal rights, the contract generally must
also specify the sale price. 243
Obligations under a contract extend beyond the parties' express
writing to everything that by law, equity, or custom follows from the
nature of the particular contract and common sense. 244 Thus, a
missing price may be found by reference to the price of identical or
similar goods frequently sold by the seller, the market price (if any),
or an independent third party such as an arbitrator. 245
If the sales price is not stated in the contract and if the object of
sale is a good that the seller sells frequently, it is presumed that the
parties intend the price at which the seller normally sells the good or
a good that is similar to it. 24 6 Alternatively, if a market price is
readily available, it is presumed that the price is the market price of
the good at or near the place where the delivery is performed. When a
market price is not available and the parties cannot agree on a price,
then the price is to be set by an independent third party or
arbitrator. 24 7 Where no market price is available, the seller does not
frequently sell the subject goods, and the parties cannot agree on an
arbitrator, the lack of a price renders the contract invalid. 248
Precisely where to draw the line between sold frequently and not
is unclear. However, decisions of the Corte di Cassazione provide

238.
See C.C. art. 1325 (setting forth the elements required of every contract).
239.
Id. art. 1346.
240.
See id. art. 1325 (listing the elements required of every contract and
referencing the sections that lay out which types of contracts must take specific forms).
241.
See id. art. 1418 (setting forth conditions that will nullify a contract). See
generally FRANCESCO GALGANO, IL CONTRATTO (2007); ANDREA TORRENTE & PIERO
SCHLESINGER, MANUALE DI DIRITTO PRIVATO 590-92 (18th ed. 2007) (describing the
Article 1418 requirements for contract formation).
242.
Antonio Giovannoni, La Causa del Contratto fra Nozione Codicistica e
Prassi Negoziale, 7-8 DIRITTO COM. D'OGGI, July-Aug. 2006, http://www.dircomm.it/
2006/n.7.8/02.html.
243.
See C.C. art. 1470 (listing price as part of the definition of a sales contract).
244.
Id. art. 1374 ("11 contratto obbliga le parti non solo a quanto e nel medesimo
espresso, ma anche a tutte le conseguenze che ne derivano secondo la legge o, in
mancanza, secondo gli usi e le equiti.").
245.
See id. art. 1474 (explaining the methods to be used to fill in a missing price
term in a contract).
246.
See id.
247.
See id.
248.
See ORESTE CAGNASSO & GASTONE COTTINO, 9 TRATTATO DI DIRITTO
COMMERCIALE: CONTRATTI COMMERCIALI 108-12 (Gastone Cottino ed., 2d ed. 2009)
(discussing how a contract will have no legal effect when the parties cannot determine
a price through available means).

562

VANDERBILTJOURNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

/VOL. 46:515

broad parameters. For example, in a case involving the sale of flowers
and plants, the Corte di Cassazione held that Article 1474's openprice term was properly filled by the price normally charged by the
seller because plants sold in nurseries are commodities sold
frequently in an active market. 249
Article 1474 has also been used to complete open-price clauses in
contracts for the sale of artistic goodS2 50 and engine lubricating oil, 2 51
as well as to determine the replacement value of and, therefore, the
price to replace an automobile destroyed in an accident. 252 By
contrast, Article 1474 was found inapplicable to a purported contract
for the construction of a sea platform. 253
The P&W-Malev case involved the sale of jet engines, which,
though not commodities like flowers or oil, are more like automobiles
than sea platforms in purpose, customization potential, and
frequency of sale. P&W sold jet engines frequently to other customers
in much the same way that a car dealer sells cars and had ready
prices for models that the buyer, Malev, could choose under the
purported agreement. Therefore, a court applying Italian law to the
P&W-Malev transaction might indeed find a valid contract by
concluding, under Article 1474, that the parties intended the price
P&W normally charges for the jet-engine model chosen by Malev.
2.

North America: United States

Substantive U.S. contract law is articulated primarily at the
state level 254 in two forms: traditionally uncodified common law, now
codified to varying degrees in different jurisdictions, 255 and the UCC.
This Article uses UCC Article 2 as representative of U.S. contract law
with two caveats: UCC Article 2 applies only to sales of goods, and

Cass. civile, sez. II, 18 gennaio 2010, n. 648 (It.).
249.
Cass. civile, sez. III, 8 maggio 2006, n. 10503 (It.).
250.
Cass. civile, sez. III, 16 gennaio 2006, n. 719 (It.).
251.
Cass. civile, sez. III, 1 giugno 2010, n. 13431 (It.).
252.
See Cass. civile, sez. I, 23 luglio 2004, n. 13807 (It.) (determining that
253.
Article 1474 did not apply because there was insufficient continuity and homogeneity
in trade practice to predict pricing).
Contract law in the United States is also found in federal common law
254.
applicable to contracts between U.S. government agencies and private parties. See
generally Willard L. Boyd III & Robert K. Huffman, The Treatment of Implied-in-Law
and Implied-in-Fact Contracts and Promissory Estoppel in the United States Claims
Court, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 605 (1991) (describing the way U.S. federal courts have
handled certain types of contractual disputes in which the United States has been a
party to the dispute); Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common
Law, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 585 (2006) (describing the contours of U.S. federal common
law, including activities in which the United States itself is a participant); Walch,
supra note 131 (analyzing certain types of contractual disputes in which a federal
agency is one of the parties).
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 13-3-1 (2010). Under Georgia law, the
255.
common-law elements of a valid contract were first codified in 1863.
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the results under Article 2 may vary across jurisdictions and from the
results obtained under state common law, 256 federal common law, 257
or other UCC articles.25 8
Under the UCC, Malev's December 21 acceptance would almost
certainly result in formation of a binding contract because UCC
Article 2 expressly honors agreements without a settled price if the
parties intend to agree despite the missing price term. 259
Under the UCC, the term goods "means all things (including
specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of
identification to the contract for sale other than money paid,
investment securities .

.

. and things in action." 260 One illustration of

the UCC's jurisdictional variability relates to whether a mixed goodsand-services contract is or is not a sale of goods subject to UCC
Article 2.
In evaluating mixed contracts, courts tend to follow one of two
tests: the predominant purpose test or the gravamen test. 26 1 Most
jurisdictions apply the predominant purpose test, 26 2 examining the
contract as a whole to determine whether goods or services
predominate. 263 In contrast, the gravamen test more narrowly

256.
According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, "[T]he formation of a
contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the
exchange and a consideration." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1981).
The practical application of this common-law approach to open-price terms has
produced differing results. See, e.g., Goldstick v. ICM Realty, 788 F.2d 456, 461 (7th
Cir. 1986) (holding a contract invalid under the common law of Illinois because of
indefinite price); In re Express Indus. & Terminal Corp. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Transp.,
93 N.Y.2d 584, 590-91 (1999) (finding a government permit to lease dock space
insufficiently definite to constitute an offer where the permit omitted the date by which
the government could exercise an option to reoccupy 7 percent of the leased property
and the amount of the rent reduction upon exercise of the option). But see Schwartz &
Scott, supra note 124, at 664-65 (2007) (noting the recent emergence of a legal rule
requiring parties to preliminary agreements with open terms to bargain over such
terms in good faith or pay reliance damages).
257.
See, e.g., Walch, supra note 131, at 1373-74 (discussing how courts have
handled contractual disputes involving the federal government).
258.
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2A-204(3) (2012) (indicating that a lease contract does
not fail for indefiniteness if the parties intend to contract and a basis for an
appropriate remedy is reasonably certain).
259.
See id. § 2-305 (explaining when parties will and will not be bound by a
contract missing the price term); see also Amato, supra note 161, at 18-19 (explaining
the UCC approach to unsettled price terms in contracts).
260.
See, e.g., MICH. COMp. LAWS § 440.2105 (1970) (defining the term goods for
the purposes of the statute); GA. CODE ANN. § 11-2-105 (2002) (same).
261.
See Pass v. Shelby Aviation, Inc., No. W1999-00018-COA-R9-CV, 2000
Tenn. App. LEXIS 247, at *8-9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2000) (discussing the tests that
courts use to determine how to treat mixed contracts).
262.
See Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc., 439 Mich. 512, 534 (1992) (noting
that the predominant purpose test is the predominate test for determining how to treat
mixed contracts).
263.
Id. at 533-38 (holding a purchaser's common-law claims for economic loss
time-barred by UCC Article 2 because the milking equipment purchase contracts at
issue did not mention installation or service); Pass, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 247, at *8-
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examines that portion of the transaction upon which the complaint is
based to determine whether its focus, and therefore the gravamen of
the complaint, is goods or services. 264
Under the gravamen test, a court would most likely find the
P&W-Malev transaction to be a UCC Article 2 sale of goods because
the apparent focus of P&W's complaint was that Malev breached its
agreement to buy goods in the form of jet engines. In contrast, the
outcome under the predominant purpose test seems less clear because
P&W's Proposal was for an assortment of goods and services in which
services, including financing and maintenance, played a major role.
Taking a closer look at predominant purpose, a consensus has
formed around the Bonebrake v. Cox 265 test, under which the UCC
applies only when the purchaser's ultimate goal is to acquire a
product with incidental services 266 -not, in contrast, to obtain
services accompanied incidentally by product.26 7
For example, in Busch v. Dyno Nobel, Inc.,268 the court applied
UCC Article 2 to a joint-venture agreement between an explosives
manufacturer and an antifreeze-recycling firm for the design and
construction of a manufacturing plant whose ultimate purpose was
the production of ethylene glycol. 269 While the plant construction was
a major contract element, the court held that UCC Article 2 governed
the joint-venture agreement because its entire focus was to create a
source of a good-ethylene glycol-not to provide services. 270

12 (explaining the nature and application of the predominant factor test); see also
Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974) (stating that the applicability of
the UCC depends on whether the contract's predominant factor, thrust, and purpose is
the rendition of service with goods incidentally involved, or a sale of goods with labor
incidentally involved).
264.
See Dixie Lime & Stone Co. v. Wiggins Scale Co., 144 Ga. App. 145, 145
(1977) (holding the UCC inapplicable to an action based entirely on a contract
provision calling for construction of a pit and installation of a scale where the
complaint alleged no defect in the scale itself); In re Trailer & Plumbing Supplies, 133
N.H. 432, 436 (1990) (describing the nature and implementation of the gravamen test);
Pass, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 247, at *8-9 (describing the gravamen test).
265.
See Bonebrake, 499 F.2d. at 960 (describing the predominant purpose test).
Ol1 Mexican Foods, Inc. v. Hanson Staple Co., 285 Ga. 288, 289-92 (2009)
266.
(holding the UCC inapplicable, under Georgia law, to a product-warranty litigation
settlement contract because the settlement was the primary focus of the contract as
evidenced in part by its title which read "agreement reached in settlement"); see also
Bonebrake, 499 F.2d. at 960.
267.
See, e.g., Busch v. Dyno Nobel, Inc., 40 F. App'x 947, 955 (6th Cir. 2002)
(applying the Bonebrake test to a mixed contract and holding that the UCC applied to
the contract since the ultimate purpose of the contract was the provision of a product);
see also Bonebrake, 499 F.2d at 960.
268.
Busch, 40 F. App'x at 947.
See id. at 949, 955 (describing the nature of the dispute and holding that
269.
the UCC would govern the contract).
270.
See id. at 955 (explaining the court's rationale for applying the UCC under
the predominant factor test).
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Applying Busch and Bonebrake to the instant case, a court would
likely find the P&W transaction to be a UCC Article 2 sale of goods
because, while financing and maintenance were important to the
transaction, Malev's primary motive was the purchase of jet engines,
to which financing and maintenance were appendages. To facilitate
discussion of the open-price term, this Article adopts this likely
finding.
Section 2-305 of the UCC permits the formation of a contract with
an open or unstated price if the parties intend to form a contract.2 7 1
Most U.S. jurisdictions agree that contractual intent requires a
meeting of the minds sufficient to create a binding agreement, 272
demonstrated by the parties' own objective manifestations rather than
by their subjective, hypothetical, or unexpressed intentions.2 78
Whether preliminary documents-such as a letter of intent,
agreement to negotiate a final agreement, or a sequence of
preliminary written communications short of a formal, signed
agreement-are sufficient to establish the intent necessary to form a
binding contract is a matter of disagreement among and within U.S.
jurisdictions. 274 Because this Article focuses on the comparative

271.
U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (2012).
272.
See, e.g., Fisk v. Fisk, 328 Mich. 570, 574 (1950) (explaining that "a meeting
of the minds upon all essential terms" is necessary to constitute a valid contract);
Busch, 40 Fed. App'x. at 953-54 (describing the existence of a contract as contingent on
whether the parties "reached a meeting of the minds sufficient to create a binding
agreement").
273.
See, e.g., D'Avanzo v. Wise & Marsac, P.C., 223 Mich. App. 314, 319 (1997)
(including "extrinsic facts" within the factors to consider during contractual
interpretation); Busch, 40 Fed. App'x. at 953-54 (noting that a letter of intent can be
just as valid as a contract under Michigan law); see also Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
843 F. Supp. 266, 306-07 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (explaining that "contractual intent is
concerned with objective manifestations of intent"), aff'd in relevant part, 133 F.3d 388
(6th Cir. 1998); Siegel v. Spinney, 357 N.W.2d 860, 862-63 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985)
(explaining that the existence of a meeting of the minds is determined by an objective
standard).
274.
See Royce de R. Barondes, The Limits of Quantitative Legal Analyses:
Chaos in Legal Scholarship and FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co., 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 161,
181-94 (1995) (explaining the variety of relationships that can result from different
preliminary instruments); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 124, at 664-65 (offering three
general scenarios that could occur in preliminary negotiations and briefly analyzing
whether a contract could exist in those scenarios); see also Weinreich v. Sandhaus, 850
F. Supp. 1169, 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that under New York law, an agreement
with open terms is too indefinite only if it cannot be rendered reasonably certain by
reference to an extrinsic standard that makes its meaning clear); Heritage Broad. Co.
v. Wilson Commc'ns, Inc., 428 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Mich. Ct. App.) (1988) (stating that an
agreement to subsequently agree may be valid if it specifies the material and essential
terms, leaving none to future negotiations). However, if a party communicates intent
not to be bound until an agreement is signed, no negotiation or oral agreement can
form a binding contract. For example, the Second Circuit applies a four-factor test to
determine whether, without a document executed by both sides, the parties intend to
be bound:
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impact of the open-price term, it does not examine interjurisdictional
disagreements over intent. Rather, it proceeds under the assumption
that the intent requirement of UCC § 2-305 was met by the
combination of P&W's detailed December 14 proposal and Malev's
December 21 acceptance letter.
When the price is open or unstated, the price constitutes a
reasonable price at the time for delivery if the contract is silent as to
price or the price is left to be agreed to by the parties and they fail to
agree. 275 Alternatively, under UCC § 2-305(3), if a price to be fixed
other than by the parties' agreement is not fixed through fault of a
party, the other may optionally treat the contract as canceled, or
unilaterally set a reasonable price2 76 in good faith.27 7 A price set
under UCC § 2-305(3) must be consistent with reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade. 278 In this context, a posted
price or a future seller or buyer's given price, price in effect, or
market price normally satisfies the good-faith requirement.27 9
P&W's December 14 offer contained a considerable amount of
information about price and, therefore, under UCC § 2-305(3), was
clearly not "silent" as to price. However, it can be argued that either
(a) after Malev's December 21 acceptance, the price of the engines
was left to be agreed by the parties-in the sense that if Malev had
chosen Airbus, the parties would have yet to agree on the final full
price of the engine systems-and they failed to agree, or (b) through
fault of one party, the price of the engines was not fixed as of
December 21, in the sense that up to that time Malev had yet to
choose between Airbus and Boeing planes, thereby keeping the
transaction price uncertain. Under alternative (a) or (b), the contract
would be legally enforceable, but the price might differ between them.

(1) whether there has been an express reservation of the right not to be
bound in the absence of a writing; (2) whether there has been partial
performance of the contract; (3) whether all of the terms of the alleged
contract have been agreed upon; and (4) whether the agreement at
issue is the type of contract that is usually committed to writing.
Winston v. Mediafare Entm't Corp., 777 F.2d 78, 80 (2d Cir. 1985). But see Knight v.
Sharif, 875 F.2d 516, 525 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that, under Mississippi law, a writing
is enforceable only if it expresses the agreement of the parties on all material terms).
275.
U.C.C. § 2-305(1)(a)-(b) (2012).
276.
Id. §2-305(3).
GA. CODE ANN. § 11-2-305 (2002); Neugent v. Beroth Oil Co., 560 S.E.2d
277.
829, 835-37 (N.C. Ct. App.) (2002); U.C.C. §2-305(2).
278.
See, e.g., Autry Petroleum Co. v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 334 F. App'x. 982,
985 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding that a seller's recapture of a prompt-pay discount in
setting sales prices for fuel products was not commercially unreasonable and satisfied
the good-faith requirement where the buyer based his allegation that the recapture
was done in bad faith on his own subjective beliefs and not on objective commercial
reality).
See, e.g., Neugent, 560 S.E.2d at 836 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-305
279.
official cmt. 3 (1965)).
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If (a), the price would be a reasonable price at the time of delivery; if
(b), the reasonable price could be set unilaterally by P&W. Either
way, the transaction would constitute a valid contract under UCC
Article 2.
3.

South America: Colombia

The P&W-Malev transaction would arguably result in a valid
agreement under Colombian law as of December 29, 1990, but not as
of Malev's December 21 acceptance letter because the Proposal did
not adequately price the engine nacelle or other parts required if
Malev chose Airbus over Boeing.
Under Colombian law, the parties' agreement as to price is
essential to the formation of an enforceable contract, 280 except where
the alleged buyer has already received the goods, in which case the
price is presumed to be the average price on the day and in the place
of delivery. 281
The agreement on price must be (a) an absolute price; (b) a price
objectively determinable at the time of payment from any
combination of factors, including market prices in active markets;282
or (c) a price to be determined by a third-party arbitrator agreed upon
or otherwise designated by the parties. 283 Any of these three pricesetting alternatives fulfills the price requirement for formation of an
enforceable agreement so long as it is agreed upon by the parties at
the time they enter into the agreement, not-in contrast to the more
liberal German approach-afterwards. 284
Applying these principles, the transaction price as of December
21, 1990, was indeterminate because Malev could choose Airbus
planes, for which the price term was incomplete because the price of
the nacelle and other parts was unstated. Viewed this way, Malev's
purported acceptance on December 21 was incomplete. Nevertheless,
as under French law, acceptance under Colombian law would
arguably have been perfected subsequently on December 29 when
Malev announced its decision to buy Boeing planes.

280.
C6DIGO CIVIL [C.C.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1864 (Colom.); C6DIGO DE COMERCIO
[C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. 920 (Colom.).
281.
C. COM. art. 920.
282.
C.C. art. 1864; C. COM. art. 921.
283.
C.C. art. 1865. If the designated arbitrator refuses to set the price, the
parties may then jointly designate an alternate arbitrator. However, if the parties
cannot agree on an alternate, the contract is null; in no case can the price be
unilaterally determined by any party to the contract. Id.
284.
ALVARO TAFUR GONZALEZ, CODIGO CIVIL 304 (20th ed. 2003) (on file with
author) (translating and quoting 10 MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGEs RIPERT, TRAITt
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 36 (2d ed. 1952)).
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on Contracts for the

The multijurisdictional discussion of open-price terms has been
hypothetical up to this point, attempting to tease out what might
result if the P&W-Malev case were decided under the law of Italy,
France, Germany, the United States, or Colombia. Under the CISG,
the discussion moves beyond hypothetical to actual. The P&W-Malev
dispute was, in fact, decided under controversial CISG Article 55285
by both the Metropolitan Court of Budapest 286 and the Supreme
7
Court of Hungary, which reached opposing conclusions. 28
The CISG attempts to harmonize international-sales contract
law, similar in some respects to the joint IASB-FASB efforts to
recognition, through a
internationally harmonize revenue
multilateral, UN-sponsored treaty now ratified by nearly all of the
world's significant trading nations.2 88 However, the practical extent
of the CISG's international harmonization is limited, 289 in part
because the CISG is official in six languages 290 and is enforced by
local jurists who interpret and apply the CISG through their own
cultural, linguistic, and economic filters. 29 1 As they interpret, courts
must fill gaps in the CISG's coverage with the general principles on
which the CISG is based or, in their absence, local law as dictated by
the rules of private international law.2 92 Not surprisingly, different

See infra notes 290-291 & 300-303 and accompanying text (explaining why
285.
Article 55 is considered controversial).
See generally F4virosi Bir6sig [Metropolitan Court] Jan. 10, 1992,
286.
3.G.50.289/1991/32 (Hung.), translated in Metropolitan Court, supra note 158 (holding
the offer sufficiently definite to support a valid agreement).
See generally Legfels6bb Bir6sdg (LB) [Supreme Court] Gf.I.31.349/1992/9
287.
(Hung.), translatedin Case I: The Supreme Court of the Republic of Hungary, 13 J.L. &
COM. 31 (1993) (finding an ambiguity in the price term that rendered a valid
agreement impossible).
The list of CISG signatory countries can be accessed at CISG: Table of
288.
Contracting States, PACE L. SCH. INST. INTL COM. L., http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/
cisg/countries/cntries.html (last updated Mar. 26, 2012). One notable nonsignatory is
the United Kingdom. Id. For a robust discussion of possible reasons why the United
Kingdom remains a CISG hold-out, see Hoffman, supra note 122.
Rosett, supra note 49, at 270 ("The Convention does not appear to recognize
289.
the reality that identical wording of a legal norm in various jurisdictions does not
preclude uncertainty resulting from different understandings and applications in
practice.").
The "equally authentic" languages of the CISG are Arabic, Chinese,
290.
English, French, Russian, and Spanish. CISG, supra note 7, art. 101.
Frank Diedrich, MaintainingUniformity in International Uniform Law via
291.
Autonomous Interpretation:Software Contracts and the CISG, 8 PACE INT'L L. REV.
303, 303-04 (1996) (indicating that the CISG 'lacks a common legal theory and practice
upon which judges and practitioners can rely," resulting in a "'homeward-trend' in
favor of the lex fori").
CISG, supra note 7, art. 7(2).
292.
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courts-even those in the same country-may reach differing
decisions in factually similar CISG cases.
Except when the parties expressly opt out of the CISG and
specify an alternate governing law, 293 the CISG generally applies to
contracts for sales of goods 294 between parties whose places of
business are in different countries when the countries are CISG
signatorieS2 95 or when the rules of private international law lead to
the application of the law of a CISG signatory. 296
The CISG contains seemingly conflicting directions regarding
open-price contracts. Under Article 14, a proposal for establishing a
contract constitutes an offer only if it is sufficiently definite and
indicates the intention of the offeror to be bound if the offeree
accepts. 297 To qualify as sufficiently definite, the proposal must
identify the goods and expressly or implicitly set or make
determinable the quantity and the price. 298 However, CISG Article 55
appears to contradict Article 14, purporting to save otherwise valid
open-price contracts:
Where a contract has been validly concluded, but does not
expressly or implicitly fix or make provision for determining the price,
the parties are considered, in the absence of any indication to the
contrary, to have impliedly made reference to the price generally
charged at the time of the conclusion of the contract for such goods sold
under comparable circumstances in the trade concerned. 2 9 9

293.
Id. art. 6.
294.
The CISG does not define goods, leaving interpretation of this term to
national courts whose local laws may yield different results. See Diedrich, supra note
291, at 307-08 (explaining how the CISG does not differentiate between merchants and
other persons). However, specifically excluded from the CISG's scope are sales
(a) of goods bought for personal, family or household use, unless the seller, at
any time before or at the conclusion of the contract, neither knew nor ought to
have known that the goods were bought for any such use;
(b) by auction;
(c) on execution or otherwise by authority of law;
(d) of stocks, shares, investment securities, negotiable instruments or money;
(e) of ships, vessels, hovercraft or aircraft; [and]
(f) of electricity.
CISG, supra note 7, art. 2.
295.
CISG, supra note 7, art. 1(1)(a).
296.
Id. art. 1(1)(b). However, under CISG Article 95, the United States has
declared that it will not be bound by CISG Article 1(1)(b). Therefore, in the absence of
the parties' express choice of the CISG as their governing law, U.S. courts will enforce
the CISG only between parties whose contract-relevant places of business are both
located in CISG signatory states. The term rules of private internationallaw refers to
"choice of law" or "conflicts of law" rules, which guide courts in determining which set
of laws to apply in resolving contract-related disputes.
297.
Id. art. 14(1).
298.
Id.
299.
Id. art. 55.
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Some commentators have attributed the dichotomy between
Article 14 and Article 55 to disagreements between Western, largely
free-market CISG signatories and socialist ones, which, at least at the
time the CISG was negotiated, required a high level of predictability
in contracting because of their reliance on centralized economic
planning.3 00
Whatever its genesis, the ambiguous relationship between
Article 14 and Article 55 has been the subject of strong disagreement
among commentators.o3 0 While acknowledging learned dissent on
this point,30 2 Loukas Mistelis argues that Article 55 applies only
when a tribunal finds the offer does not otherwise fail under local law
for lack of a definite price. 3 03 Consistent with Albert H. Kritzer's
view, tribunals that have considered the question have applied
Article 55 to save CISG contracts when the offer, including its price
term, is sufficiently definite to establish a valid 304 contract under the
tribunal's local contract law, which may3 05 or may not 30 6 take into
consideration local conflicts-of-law rules.

See Alejandro M. Garro, Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the U.N.
300.
Convention on Contracts for the InternationalSale of Goods, 23 INT'L LAW. 443, 462
(1989) (explaining that delegates from socialist countries thought an acceptance must
be in complete agreement with the author, while common-law delegates thought an
acceptance was enforceable so long as it did not materially alter the terms of the offer);
Rosett, supra note 49, at 288-89 (describing how socialist governments consider openterm contracts a threat to the security of the agreement).
See Helen Elizabeth Hartnell, Rousing the Sleeping Dog: The Validity
301.
Exception to the Convention on Contracts for the InternationalSale of Goods, 18 YALE J.
INT'L LAW 1, 66-69 (1993) (summarizing some theoretical disagreements that have
emerged about open-price terms); Loukas Mistelis, Article 55 CISG: The Unknown
Factor,25 J.L. & COM. 285, 286-88, 290-91 (2005) (explaining why the "first and main
point of controversy" related to Article 55 is-its "interplay" with Article 14).
See Mistelis, supra note 301, at 289 n.20 (framing the controversy of Article
302.
55 by presenting the opposing views of E. Allan Farnsworth and John Honnold,
respectively, that Article 55 applies only to a validly concluded contract and, by
contrast, that a contract may be validly concluded under Article 55 even though it
neither expresses nor implies a determinate price).
Id. at 289 n.21 (quoting ALBERT H. KRITZER,
303.
APPLICATIONS -OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON

GUIDE TO PRACTICAL
CONTRACTS FOR THE

INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 134-35 (Supp. 7 1993)).
Under the CISG, the scope of contract validity is deliberately vague and
304.
subject to local interpretation. See Hartnell, supra note 301, at 37-40 (1993)
(discussing the relationship between the CISG and the International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law in the context of different nations' domestic policies
concerning contracts). However, validity is typically viewed with reference to features
of the domestic law of the forum that might render a contract void, voidable, or even
unenforceable. Id. at 44-45. These include, without limitation, capacity, formal
validity, open-price terms, duress, fraud, mistake, illegality, immorality, and
.
unconscionability. Id. at 63-86.
See, e.g., Geneva Pharms. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d
305.
236, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (equating "domestic law" of the forum with "governing law" as
identified through "traditional conflict of laws analysis"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on
other grounds, 386 F.3d 485 (2d Cir. 2004); Oberlandesgericht Rostock [OLG ROSTOCK]
[Rostock Appellate Court] Oct. 10, 2001, 6 U 126/00 (Ger.), translated at
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In the actual P&W-Malev case, in 1992, the Metropolitan Court
of Budapest held that the price term in P&W's December 14, 1990,
offer was sufficiently definite to support a valid agreement. 307 Later
in that same year, the Hungarian Supreme Court reversed the
Metropolitan Court, holding that the ambiguity of the price term in
P&W's purported offer made agreement between the parties
impossible. 308
In holding the price term fatally indefinite, the Hungarian
Supreme Court found that P&W's December 14 Proposal embodied
two separate purported offers, each deficient as to price: (1) an offer
applicable in case Malev chose Boeing planes, for the purchase of
either of two alternative jet engines and related services; and (2) an
offer applicable to Airbus planes, for the purchase of either of two jetengine systems and related services. 3 0 9 The Boeing offer, so found the
court, stated the price of one engine model but not the other. 310
Meanwhile, the Airbus offer omitted the additional price associated
with the full engine system.3 11 Neither of the two purported offers
stated the price of the related services.31 2
That two courts-sitting in the same city, speaking the same
language, and applying the same law to the same facts-could arrive
at diametrically opposing conclusions on an issue of apparent
simplicity illustrates the unpredictability of legal contract
enforceability on which the ED exclusively relies. In fairness to
Hungary and the CISG, such unpredictability is endemic to contract
litigation throughout the world. Breach-of-contract decisions by lower
courts are often reversed at the end of appeals processes that may
last decades. 313

http://www.cisg.law.pace.edulcisg/wais/db/cases2/011010g1.html (invoking German law
under Article 55 of the CISG to fill an unstated price, in a contract for sale of crawfish,
with the market price upon execution of the agreement of comparable goods, in the
same business, under similar circumstances).
306.
See, e.g., Berry v. Ken M. Spooner Farms, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
31262, *2-6 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (applying Washington law, without reference to
conflict-of-laws analysis, to uphold the validity of a contractual limitation-of-liability
clause in a CISG contract), rev'd on other grounds, 254 F. App'x 646 (9th Cir. 2007);
Russian Fed'n Arbitration Proceeding 185/2000 (Trib. Int'l Com. Arb., Russian Fed'n
(applying
Comm. & Indus. 2001), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edulcases/010530r2.html
Russian Federation Civil Code Article 424, which allows formation of open-price
contracts, under CISG Article 55 to save as valid a contract between a Russian seller
and non-Russian buyer in which price was not stated).
307.
F~vdrosi Bir6sdg [Metropolitan Court] Jan. 10, 1992, 3.G.50.289/1991/32
(Hung.), translatedin Metropolitan Court, supranote 158, at 51.
308.
Legfels6bb Bir6sdg (LB) [Supreme Court] Gf.I.31.349/1992/9 (Hung.),
translatedin HungarianSupreme Court, supra note 165, at 44-46.
309.
Id. at 43.
310.
Id.
311.
Id.
312.
Id. at 44.
See, e.g., Cass. civile, sez. III, 8 maggio 2006, n. 10503 (It.) (reversing the
313.
lower court two decades after the suit was originally filed).
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In conclusion, with respect to the open-price term issue under
the CISG, the legal validity of the contract and, therefore, the
contract's enforceability under the ED, is determined with reference
to local contract law as interpreted and applied by the court with
jurisdiction over the case. This reinforces the view that if accountingstandard setters want a timely, clear, and reliable revenue
recognition benchmark, legal enforceability may not be the best
choice.
5.

Legal Analysis Summary

Table 2 summarizes the likely outcomes-in terms of enforceable
agreement or not-for each of the chosen jurisdictions. At December
21 and 29, these outcomes vary between and even within
jurisdictions:

Table 2-Likely Stage 1 Legal Results by Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction
United States (UCC)
Germany
Italy
France
Colombia
CISG

Enforceable
Contract on 12-21?
Yes
Yes
Probably
No
No
Tracks forum law

Enforceable
Contract on 12-29?
Yes
Yes
Probably
Probably
Probably
Tracks forum law

Generally speaking, contracts are more likely to be legally
enforceable in Germany and the United States than in France and
Colombia because in comparison to the laws of the latter, the laws of
the former are biased in favor of contract formation. Italy falls
between the extremes. Meanwhile, the CISG tracks the underlying
tendency of the law of the forum with jurisdiction over the case. This
CISG-specific rule introduces yet another complexity into the ED's
contract-analysis process because it may be impossible to determine
in advance, when accountants and auditors must make their
accounting determinations, which court will decide a case that has
not yet been filed.
Within jurisdictions, the parties' actions moving through time
affect legally material facts, including the definiteness of the price
term. As a result, the contract-analysis outcomes also vary within
jurisdictions by point in time. Within this Article's factual context,
time appears immaterial to contract formation under German law
and the UCC. However, time is material under French, Italian, and
Colombian law and, by derivation, under the CISG in these three
jurisdictions.
This time-based contract diversity could result in revenue
recognition timing differences when transaction negotiation, contract
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formation, or contract performance occurs very close to or straddles
the end of a financial reporting period. Beyond mere timing, in some
jurisdictions-such as France, Italy, Colombia, and Hungary-the
existence of recognizable revenue may be open to question because
the law on open-price terms may permanently preclude the formation
of a valid contract.
C. ContractAnalysis: ED Paragraphs14 and 15

ED paragraphs 14 and 15 employ five tests to verify the
applicability of the ED and the existence of the contract for revenue
recognition purposes. 314 Here, this Article applies the paragraph 14
and 15 tests to the purported P&W-Malev contract.
1.

Paragraph 14(a): Commercial Substance

Viewed through a purely legal perspective, under ED paragraph
14(a), the commercial substance of the purported contract depends on
its legal enforceability, which, in turn, varies with time and
jurisdiction. This is because each party can theoretically invoke
judicial power to force the other to either specifically perform a
legally enforceable contract or, alternatively, pay compensation in the
form of damages. Either approach can justify the expectation of cash
flow. Thus, on December 21, the contract would pass the paragraph
14(a) test under German and U.S. law, might pass under Italian law,
but would not pass under Colombian or French law. Later, on
December 29, the likelihood of passing under French and Colombian
law would increase substantially.
However, while contextualized by paragraph 13's legalistic
definition of contract, paragraph 14 does not directly invoke legal
enforceability, requiring only that the "risk, timing or amount of the
entity's future cash flows [be] expected to change as a result of the
contract." 315 Arguably, in the vast majority of commercial
relationships, the parties can be expected to perform their commercial
obligations, whether legally enforceable or not, because doing so
forms a Nash equilibrium in the sense that, typically, each party has
economic incentives to perform independent external enforcement. 316
Perhaps the most powerful performance incentive is that failure to
fulfill commitments can result in exclusion from the market as word
reaches other potential counterparties that this player should not be
trusted.

314.
315.
316.

EXPOSURE DRAF1T, supra note 1,
14-15.
Id. 14(a) (emphasis added).
See WATSON, supra note 76, and accompanying text.
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Paragraph 14(b): Parties' Commitment

At December 21 and 29, 1990, the available evidence-including
P&W's December 14 Proposal, P&W's December 21 Proposal
extension, Malev's detailed December 21 acceptance, and the parties'
extended dialogue regarding advertising and implementation of their
agreement-is persuasive that the parties had both approved of and
were committed to Malev's purchase of P&W jet engines. Thus, at
least as of December 21 and 29, the paragraph 14(b) commitment test
was met. It was only months later, on March 25, 1991, that Malev
signaled by letter that it might not be committed to following through
with the agreement.
3.

Paragraph 14(c): Parties' Rights

Legally speaking, the contract meets or misses paragraph 14(c)
depending on the contract's legal enforceability, which itself turns on
timing and jurisdiction. Because this Article has assumed the
contract was legally enforceable as of December 21 (in the case of the
United States, Germany, and possibly Italy) or December 29
(Colombia, Italy, and France), P&W would be legally entitled as of the
applicable enforceability date to the sales price pertaining to Malev's
chosen engine model on a schedule determined by the contract's
terms. These terms might call for payment before or after delivery of
the engines. In like manner, as of the same dates, Malev was itself
legally entitled to receive the promised engines from P&W and legally
bound to pay for them.
4.

Paragraph 14(d): Terms and Manner of Payment

Paragraph 14(d) requires only that the entity "can identify the
payment terms for the goods or services to be transferred."3 17 The
P&W-Malev transaction arguably met this test on December 14,
1990, in that the terms and manner of payment appear to have been
clearly identified in the Proposal delivered on that date.
5.

Paragraph 15: Termination Compensation

The termination compensation requirement was met, if at all, at
the point in time when the contract became legally enforceable as a
contract, because paragraph 15 theoretically disregards only those
wholly unperformed contracts under which neither party can extract
compensation from the other for terminating the contract.3 18

317.
318.

EXPOSURE DRAFT, supranote 1,
Id. T 15.

14(d).
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If enforceable on December 21 or 29, the contract was wholly
unperformed within the meaning of paragraph 15 in the sense that at
that time it was apparently a mere exchange of promises; neither
P&W nor Malev had yet performed any obligation under it. Because
of the contract's wholly unperformed status, ED paragraph 15 would
require P&W to verify that at least one of the two parties could not
unilaterally terminate the contract without compensating the
other.319 If at any moment in time Malev's acceptance created an
enforceable contractual obligation, then by definition neither party
could terminate the contract without incurring some penalty in the
form of damages or an order of specific performance. Thus, assuming
the existence of an enforceable contract, the termination penalty
requirement was arguably satisfied.
Even in the absence of a legally enforceable contract, each party
might potentially have been liable to the other via culpa in
contrahendo, promissory estoppel, quasi-contract, 320 or a similar
noncontract liability doctrine. 321 For example, P&W could have
argued under German law that Malev was liable for culpa in
contrahendo damages equivalent to the value of the costs P&W
incurred in bidding on the jet engine deal and negotiating with Malev
between December 1990 and March 1991. However, the ED does not
account for pre- or extra-contractual obligations. Therefore, in the
absence of a legally binding contract, those obligations have no role in
relation to paragraph 15.
Table 3 summarizes the application of ED paragraphs 14 and 15
to the P&W-Malev scenario. In the table, letters "a" to "d" represent
ED paragraph 14 subparagraphs, while the letter "e" represents
paragraph 15. Upper-case letters (e.g., "A") identify criteria clearly
satisfied; lower-case letters (e.g., "a") identify criteria probably,
though not clearly, met. A missing letter indicates that the criterion
represented by that letter is not satisfied.

319.
Id.
320.
See supra notes 121-135 and accompanying text (explaining implied and
noncontract obligations generally).
321.
See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and
PreliminaryAgreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661 (2007), cited supra notes 124, 256, 274.
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Table 3-Likely Results: ED paras. 14,15
Jurisdiction
France
Germany
Italy
United States
Colombia
CISG

ED paras. 14, 15 tests
met on 12-21
B, D, E
A, B, C, D, E
a, B, c, D, E
A, B, C, D, E
B, D, E
Varies with jurisdiction

ED paras. 14, 15 tests
met on 12-29
a, B, c, D, E
A, B, C, D, E
a, Bc, D, E
A, B, C, D, E
a, B, c, D, E
a, B, c, D, E, but varies
I with

jurisdiction

D. Recognition: EDparagraphs23-80
In the P&W-Malev case, under ED paragraphs 23-30, the first
step in the Stage 2 revenue recognition process is to identify separate
performance obligations in the contract. Access to factual details is
limited, but it is apparent that the P&W Proposal offered a bundle of
goods and services including engines or engine systems, spare parts,
financing, maintenance, and an option to buy additional engines.
Each of these would presumably be considered a separate
performance obligation under the ED, except for the option contract,
which would be accounted for as a financial derivative instrument
under another accounting standard. Next, under ED paragraphs 5069, P&W would determine the transaction price and then, under
paragraphs 70-80, allocate that price among the previously identified
performance obligations.
The final hurdle for revenue recognition is satisfaction of one or
more performance obligations through transfer of a specified good or
service. Transfer, as outlined in Figure 2, requires a shift in control
over the good or service from seller to customer. A shift in control is
indicated, under paragraphs 31-48, by the customer's unconditional
obligation to pay, in the transfer of risks and rewards of ownership of
goods, or transfer of legal title to or possession of the goods. Nothing
in the available P&W-Malev facts suggests that any control-shifting
criterion was met under the law of any of the jurisdictions examined
for this Article with respect to goods. Therefore, no transfer of goods
occurred. Thus, regardless of the outcome of the Stage 1 contract
analysis, no contract revenue associated with goods would be
recognized under the ED on the P&W-Malev facts at any point on the
transaction timeline.
Whether Malev might be obligated to P&W for a transfer of
services or under a pre- or non-contract theory for P&W's good-faith
expenditures in expectation of the contract presents a different
question. P&W may have made significant expenditures in preparing
for what it apparently believed in good faith would be a contract. If
P&W did make such expenditures, it might invoke promissory
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estoppel, quasi-contract, culpa in contrahendo, or a similar doctrine.
Similarly, if P&W effectively transferred financing-related services
under a Stage 1-qualifying contract, it would be entitled to recognize
contract revenue for those services.
As the ED is currently written, it is conceivable that a seller
could transfer goods or services within the meaning of paragraphs
31-48-through, e.g., German separation and abstraction-and yet
lack the contract necessary for recognition under ED paragraphs 1315. Perhaps more likely is a timeline, similar to that of the P&WMalev case, where months after events that establish a contract, a
tribunal finds that a contract formed months ago and then holds then
breaching buyer liable for damages. 3 22 The ED does not indicate how
to account for delayed judicial determinations of legal enforceability,
thus leaving accounting practitioners to search for nonauthoritative
guidance 323 or to draw their own conclusions.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In Part I, this Article defined revenue recognition, documented
its independent importance as a firm-value and financialperformance metric, and placed it squarely at the accountingcontract law nexus in the context of a proposed accounting standard
built on a contract-law foundation. This Article documented the legal
community's lack of involvement in the ED's development, the
disagreement among accounting professionals regarding the
relationship between contracts and revenue recognition, and
misperceptions in the legal community regarding authoritative
accounting standards. It also called for greater collaboration between
legal and accounting professionals in creating value, allocating value,
and mitigating risk through effective use of contract law and revenue
recognition.
Part II modeled the ED's contract-law-centered revenue process,
from verification of contract existence to recognition and
measurement; highlighted differences among the ED, SAB No. 104,
and IAS 18; and identified potential revenue-producing transactions
and relationships that fall beyond the scope of the ED and other
accounting guidance.
Part III applied the ED, internationally and comparatively, to an
actual transaction, demonstrating the complexity of the process and
the variability of results stemming, in part, from the ED's reliance on
legal enforceability as its sole recognition benchmark. The foregoing
findings inform the recommendations below.

322. See supra notes 286-287 and accompanying text.
323.
See supra notes 27, 138 and accompanying
nonauthoritative sources may be relied upon).

text

(discussing when
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First, accounting-standard setters should reconsider whether the
benefits of requiring legal enforceability for revenue recognition
outweigh the associated measurement costs and uncertainty.
Arguably, within and across jurisdictions, the ED's legal
enforceability criterion creates unnecessary, costly, and risk-inflating
complexity that the accounting and auditing professions appear illprepared to address.
Under the ED, legal enforceability functions as a commitment
surrogate. The ED uses the legally enforceable contract as externally
verifiable evidence that the buyer and seller are so committed to
perform that cash or other assets are expected to flow between them.
Yet, legal enforceability may be both under- and over-inclusive as a
cash-flow indicator. For example, the ED precludes recognition of
revenue from a legally unenforceable yet self-enforcing Nash
equilibrium that nevertheless justifies the expectation of future cash
flow. 324 Conversely, theoretically enforceable contracts may generate
no cash flow because judicial enforcement fails for practical or
procedural reasons.
While the ED's emphasis on enforceable rights and obligations
may be consistent with behavioral realities, its focus on legally
enforceable contracts is arguably not so. IAS 32,325 IAS 18,326 and
329
SAB No. 104,327 as well as FASC 328 and CFA Institute comment
letters, all advocate a more expansive concept that includes both
legally and nonlegally binding relationships. Along similar lines, the
ED should account for non- or pre-contractual legal doctrines like
3 30
promissory estoppel, culpa in contrahendo, quantum meruit, and

separation and abstraction,33 1 which can also drive cash flows even in
the absence of legally enforceable contracts. Similarly, the ED should
define all key terms-such as consideration-that appear to be
borrowed from the legal lexicon. Failure to provide those definitions
will likely exacerbate interjurisdictional diversity in applying the new
revenue recognition standard.
Including all committed customer-seller relationships in the
ED's scope could mitigate interjurisdictional variability of revenue
results and might defuse the argument, important in some
jurisdictions, that financial- statement recognition implies admission
See WATSON, supra note 76, at 139-41 (describing the use of the Nash
324.
equilibrium in the legal context).
See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
325.
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
326.
See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
327.
See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
328.
See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
329.
See supra notes 121-134 and accompanying text (explaining implied and
330.
noncontract obligations generally); see also BORGERLICHES GESETZBURCH [BGB] [CIVIL
CODE], Aug. 18, 1896, §§ 241-853 (outlining the German law of obligations).
See supra notes 223-229 and accompanying text (discussing the German
331.
principle of separation and abstraction).

2013]

LEXIS NEXUS COMPLEXUS: LAWAND REVENUE ACCOUNTING COLLIDE

579

of legal liability. Some might argue that Nash equilibria are harder to
verify than legally binding contracts and, therefore, more difficult to
audit. However, it is not clear that audit firms are equipped to
competently and cost-effectively test purported contracts for legal or
practical enforceability, or that formal, verifiable enforceability
equates to reliability in predicting cash flows. In any event, because
Nash equilibrium-based commitments are common in some cultures
and markets (e.g., China),33 2 a truly international revenue accounting
standard should address them.
In this connection, the boards may wish to revisit apparent
redundancies in ED paragraphs 13, 14, and 15. The additional
contract filters imposed by paragraphs 14 and 15 may render
paragraph 13 unnecessary. In place of the technically challenging
paragraph 13 tests for legal enforceability, the boards might consider
shifting the analytical emphasis to paragraph 14's commercial
substance and Nash-like commitment criteria, of which legal
enforceability might serve as one form of supporting evidence.
Meanwhile, audit firms should engage legal counsel to assist them in
preparing to deal with contract-law nuances of the ED in the audit
context.
Currently, under the guidance of SAB No. 104, one practical
effect of using the phrase persuasive evidence of an arrangement in
place of legally enforceable contract is to shift revenue recognition
judgment calls away from the legal profession and toward accounting.
The ED is likely to send those calls in the opposite direction. Whether
this reversal is good for the market and the professions is a question
for further inquiry. Legal and accounting professions should take a
closer look at whether the definition and interpretation of revenue
should be collaboratively shared.
The likelihood of interjurisdictional revenue recognition
disparities under the ED suggests that attorneys should draft
contractual choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses only after
carefully considering how these choices may interact with the ED to
affect revenue recognition. Similarly, accountants and auditors who
apply the ED in accounting for and auditing revenue should
understand applicable contract law and should probabilistically
assess whether and, if so, how that law is likely to be enforced in the
specific circumstances. Some countries (e.g., Germany and the United
States) take a more expansive view of contract formation than others
(e.g., France, Colombia, and Italy). When given the choice, ceteris
paribus, a seller wishing to increase the speed and probability of
recognizing revenue should favor the law of the former over the
latter.

332.
See, e.g., Matheson, supra note 6, at 345 (highlighting the Chinese tendency
to rely on relationships and ongoing negotiation in place of legalistic written contracts,
which carry negative cultural connotations in China).

580

VANDERBILTJOURNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 46:515

In the United States,- defense counsel in securities and other
accounting-related litigation should strive to better educate the
judiciary regarding the meaning and authoritative hierarchy of
accounting standards and guidance. Judicial decisions citing SABs as
SEC rules, or otherwise as authoritative, signal shortcomings. In this
context, the U.S. Congress and courts should consider requiring the
SEC to issue regulatory accounting interpretations through noticeand-comment rulemaking in place of SABs promulgated without
public input. Accounting academics should also use the phrase U.S.
GAAP more precisely 333 to avoid endowing non-GAAP literature with
GAAP authority. The alternative may be that whatever international
harmonization is intended by the ED is erased by staff
interpretations that do not reflect SEC views, constituent input, or
international consensus.
In light of how SABs (especially SAB No. 104) have been applied
by the SEC and the courts, legal and accounting professionals dealing
with SEC registrants should bear in mind that despite the ED's
international scope, its application in the United States will be
colored by SEC rules and staff interpretations, just as under current
guidance. Similarly, outside the United States, the ED will be
interpreted and applied with local flavor. This diversity of
enforcement will almost certainly lead to disparate revenue
expectations and results for which attorneys, accountants, and
auditors should prepare.
Finally, the contract-law ambiguity present in the ED suggests
that regulatory authorities, like the SEC or the European
Commission, should consider ways to improve the interaction
between accounting standards and law. One approach might be to
require organizations that set accounting standards, like the FASB
and IASB, to include among their membership legal experts who can
assist in drafting accounting standards congruent with legal norms.
Another possibility might be to encourage or require U.S. accounting
professionals to receive additional training in the law. Meanwhile,
legal professionals around the world should participate more actively
in providing commentary on proposed accounting standards.

333.
See, e.g., Donelson et al., supra note 34 (incorrectly identifying SAB No. 101
as U.S. GAAP).

